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Melissa Hamilton∗ 
ABSTRACT 
The United States has earned its nickname as a mass 
incarceration nation. The federal criminal justice system has 
contributed to this status with its own increasing rate of 
incarceration. The federal system now ranks as the largest 
population of sentenced prisoners in the country; it is even larger 
than the national prisoner populations among all European 
countries, save one. This is a recent phenomenon. This Article 
ties the increase in the federal incarceration rate to policies 
adopted by the U.S. Sentencing Commission since its inception 
that presume imprisonment as the default sentence. Since the 
Sentencing Commission’s creation in 1984, the proportion of 
federal sentences requiring incarceration increased from under 
50% to over 90%. This Article provides evidence that the prison-
by-default position by the Sentencing Commission is contrary to 
congressional intent when the Legislature passed sentencing 
reform laws in the 1980s, has contributed to a federal prison 
system that is operating over capacity, and wastes resources. The 
increasing rate of imprisonment at the federal level conflicts with 
the downward trend in national crime rates and with the states’ 
sentencing experiences in which probation sentences continue to 
be preferred. Potential alternative explanations for the 
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significant trend toward the affirmative use of imprisonment in 
federal sentences are outlined, yet the available statistical 
evidence generally rules them out. Finally, suggestions on 
changes to the sentencing guidelines and to judicial sentencing 
practices are offered. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States’ criminal justice system has earned the 
dishonorable nickname “mass incarceration” to describe the 
country as achieving the world’s highest rate of incarceration, 
despite representing the wealthiest democracy.1 A writer 
cynically refers to the nation’s plight as “the caging of America.”2 
Recent measures show that, per 100,000 persons in the national 
population, America’s incarceration rate is 716.3 The next 
highest in the world are St. Kitts & Nevis at 714 and Seychelles 
 1. ROY WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD PRISON POPULATION 
LIST 1 (10th ed. 2013), available at http://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/prisonstudies.org/ 
files/resources/downloads/wppl_10.pdf; Lynn Adelman, What the Sentencing Commission 
Ought to Be Doing: Reducing Mass Incarceration, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 295, 295–96 
(2013). 
 2. Adam Gopnik, The Caging of America, NEW YORKER, Jan. 30, 2012, at 72, 72.  
 3. WALMSLEY, supra note 1, at 1 (including pretrial detainees). 
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at 709.4 Comparing the United States to other Westernized 
countries, the radical nature of the former’s prison situation 
becomes clear. Canada’s incarceration rate is 118 while the 
median for Western European countries is 98.5 Another measure 
is equally striking: the United States’ general population 
comprises 5% of the world’s total population, yet the United 
States’ prison population constitutes 25% of the world’s prison 
population.6 By these yardsticks, America does not appear to 
truly exemplify the “land of the free.”7 
The country’s extreme incarceration rate has attracted 
international attention, virtually all negative. Foreign 
newspapers variously chastise the United States for being “in 
another universe when it comes to incarceration rates,”8 
exhibiting likely the highest imprisonment rate ever in history,9 
and sustaining a “sprawling penal archipelago of federal, state[,] 
and county prisons that has sucked up public money for 
decades.”10 A Bangladesh news column compares the United 
States’ prison system to those of Russia and China, in which they 
all “spotlight the medieval mind-set and contemporary 
totalitarian practices of the societies that created them.”11 
As a result, a robust coalition of interested parties has 
developed, demanding substantial changes to reduce America’s 
penchant for incarcerating people.12 Others have contended that 
a primary method of reducing a prison population is to 
dramatically lower the length of prison sentences 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 1, 3 tbl.2. 
 6. JUSTICE POLICY INST., HOW TO SAFELY REDUCE PRISON POPULATIONS AND 
SUPPORT PEOPLE RETURNING TO THEIR COMMUNITIES 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/10-06_fac_forimmediaterelease_ps-ac.pdf. 
 7. See Eli Lehrer, Responsible Prison Reform, NAT’L AFF., Summer 2013, at 19, 25 
(“[T]here is something deeply hypocritical about a country that claims to prize freedom 
having the world’s highest incarceration rate.”). 
 8. Andrew Sullivan, Op-Ed., The Crack Dens Are Closed, so Can We Try a Little 
Tolerance Now?, SUNDAY TIMES, Aug. 18, 2013, at 20. 
 9. Lisa Kerr, Op-Ed., Our Aboriginal Prison System, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 12, 
2013, at A23 (observing that “[n]o other country matches [the size of the U.S. prison 
population], not by a long shot”). 
 10. Peter Huck, Tough Times Force Rethink on Prisons, N.Z. HERALD (Apr. 23, 
2011), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10721089. 
 11. Sherwood Ross, U.S., Russia, China, All Torture Prisoners, OPEDNEWS (Aug. 
11, 2013, 2:09 PM), http://www.opednews.com/articles/U-S--Russia-China-All-T-by-
Sherwood-Ross-130811-719.html, reprinted in Prisoners Are Subjected to Tortures 
Globally, NEW NATION, Aug. 14, 2013. 
 12. See David Dagan & Steven M. Teles, The Conservative War on Prisons, WASH. 
MONTHLY, Nov./Dec. 2012, at 25, 25–27 (noting that countering the incarceration 
epidemic has attracted a combination of liberal and conservative figures and 
organizations). 
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systematically.13 A suggestion relative to the federal prison 
system is to scale back what is perceived as federal 
overcriminalization and surrender most prosecutions to the 
states, considering the federalist system of government and the 
traditionally primary role that states have held in prosecuting 
crimes.14 A focus on incarceration at the federal level appears 
justified. While the world’s high of 716 prisoners per 100,000 
residents represents the entire country’s combined correctional 
facilities, the federal government’s role in prosecuting and 
imprisoning offenders has grown substantially over the last 
thirty years.15 Today, the federal prison system is the largest in 
the country in terms of the number of people it houses.16  
Concerning the federal prison system, then, suggestions for 
reducing the length of prison stays and the reach of federal 
crimes represent admirable and reasonable policy proposals. Yet 
another policy recommendation that is at least equally relevant, 
though it has received far less attention, is to overhaul the so-
called in/out decision17—that is, the determination as to whether 
a convicted defendant is sentenced to any term of imprisonment, 
as compared to some alternative to prison, such as fine-only, 
probation, or other type of community supervision.18 An 
important contributor to the overcapacity of federal prisons today 
is the dramatic change over time in the in/out decision. Over a 
 13. See, e.g., Lehrer, supra note 7, at 27 (“[S]entences should be assigned to 
maximize punishment rather than to simply warehouse people.”). 
 14. See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn 
from the States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 523–27 (2011) (chronicling the rapid growth of 
federal criminal law and its conflict with traditional federalism concerns and judicial 
criticism of the overfederalization of criminal law). But see Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. 
Grobey, Overfederalization of Criminal Law? It’s a Myth, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2013, at 23, 
31–32 (contending major issues lie not with overfederalization but in differences in moral 
decisions by federal and state authorities, disparities due to prosecutorial discretion, and 
“draconian” length of sentences). 
 15. See WALMSLEY, supra note 1, at 1 (“The United States has the highest prison 
population rate in the world, 716 per 100,000 of the national population . . . .”); infra 
Figures 2–3 (highlighting the rapid rise in the number and rate of federally sentenced 
prisoners). 
 16. See infra Figure 4. 
 17. See NANCY LA VIGNE & JULIE SAMUELS, URBAN INST., THE GROWTH & 
INCREASING COST OF THE FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM: DRIVERS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 3 
(2012), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412693-The-Growth-and-
Increasing-Cost-of-the-Federal-Prison-System.pdf (recognizing two main contributors to 
the federal prison population are front-end decisions regarding the volume of admissions 
and the length of time served); Todd R. Clear & James Austin, Reducing Mass 
Incarceration: Implications of the Iron Law of Prison Populations, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 307, 312 (2009) (“[T]he size of a prison population is completely determined by two 
factors: how many people go to prison and how long they stay.”). 
 18. See Gerald R. Smith, A Renewed Call for an “In/Out” Guideline, 12 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 110, 110 (1999). 
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twenty-five-year period, the rate of alternative sentences in the 
federal system plummeted from over 50% to 10% in fiscal 2012.19 
The federal system is an outlier here where probation sentences, 
for example, remain the norm in the states.20 
This Article contends that the time is ripe for the institutions 
comprising the federal sentencing system to implement an in/out 
policy that prefers a nonprison sentence unless there are 
substantial reasons in the individual case that indicate 
imprisonment is necessary. Such a policy would provide benefits 
such as reducing federal prison overcrowding, lowering the overall 
rate of imprisonment, allowing for rehabilitative results, and 
providing more equitable and just outcomes. The argument 
proceeds as follows. Part II outlines how prison became the default 
sentence in the federal system and why such policy is contrary to 
congressional intent when the Legislature overhauled the federal 
sentencing system in the 1980s. Part III advances a host of reasons 
why a policy reversal that reengages alternatives is timely. It also 
sets forth how changes in law and culture can bring about the policy 
change. Conclusions then follow. Throughout the Article, statistical 
measures are utilized to support and visually illustrate the concepts 
presented. The years represented in the empirical measures will 
vary, based largely on the purpose for the particular observation, as 
well as on the availability of relevant data. 
II. THE PRESUMPTION OF PRISON IN FEDERAL SENTENCING 
The premise of this Article is that imprisonment has 
regrettably become the clear default sentence in the federal 
criminal justice system.21 Notably, this is a relatively 
contemporary phenomenon since as recently as three to four 
decades ago the likelihood of a prison or alternative sentence 
(e.g., straight probation, probation plus some community-based 
program, or fine-only) in federal corrections was roughly equal. 
The divergence is evidenced in Figure 1. Ever since the 1980s, 
 19. See infra Figure 1. 
 20. See Andrew Horwitz, The Costs of Abusing Probationary Sentences: 
Overincarceration and the Erosion of Due Process, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 753, 753–54, 759–60 
(2010) (“[P]robation has become by far the most common form of criminal 
sentencing. . . . Probation cases accounted for . . . three quarters of the growth in the 
number of offenders under community supervision in 2007. Projections predict continued 
growth.” (footnote omitted)); infra Figure 1 (illustrating that the federal system 
significantly favors imprisonment over other sentencing alternatives, including 
probation). 
 21. Ryan S. King, A Change of Course: Developments in State Sentencing Policy and 
Their Implications for the Federal System, 22 FED. SENT’G REP. 48, 51 (2009) (referencing 
“incarceration first” mentality). 
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the consistent trend away from any sentence other than one 
requiring imprisonment has been marked and is concerning. In 
fiscal 2012, only about one out of ten sentenced federal 
defendants was spared a prison sentence, and preliminary 
estimates for fiscal 2013 are consistent therewith.22 
 
Figure 1: Federal Defendants Sentenced Each Year to 
Prison or Alternatives23 
The reasons for the significant decline are explored herein. It 
will become evident that the particular years at the beginning of 
the plunge, i.e., the mid-1980s, are meaningful in that it was 
during this same time period that federal sentencing experienced 
significant changes in law and policy. A major shift in sentencing 
philosophy developed, Congress passed sentencing law reforms, 
and the agency that Congress in its reform legislation created—
 22. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT: FOURTH 
QUARTER 2013, at 30 tbl.18 (2013), http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Federal_ 
Sentencing_Statistics/Quarterly_Sentencing_Updates/USSC_2013_Quarter_Report_4th.p
df. 
 23. Data compiled from U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING STATISTICS fig.D (2013) [hereinafter 2012 SOURCEBOOK]; U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS fig.D (2012); UNIV. AT 
ALBANY, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE tbl.5.23.2010 (2010), 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5232010.pdf. The Commission’s Sourcebooks, 
which are referenced throughout this Article, can be found at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
Publications/Annual_Reports_and_Statistical_Sourcebooks/index.cfm. The 1996–2011 
Sourcebooks can be found under the “Archives” link. 
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the U.S. Sentencing Commission—adopted policies representing 
an overt objective of assuming prison as the default sentence. 
A. Philosophical Shift 
The federal system of punishment traditionally represented 
an indeterminate system in which federal judges possessed broad 
discretion to determine sentences in individual cases.24 In 1910 a 
federal parole board was established.25 While judges still 
maintained dominion over the type and length of the sentence 
issued, subject to a few statutory limitations, parole officials 
generally controlled if and when prisoners would be released 
early.26  
The indeterminate system was justified at the time 
considering that the correctional philosophies for the federal 
prison system then relied upon rehabilitation as an appropriate 
goal.27 A rehabilitative model appropriately relies on an 
assessment of the individual offender and his experiences, 
capabilities, and recidivism risk.28 The philosophy of 
rehabilitation also explains the commonality of probation in an 
indeterminate system since many believe that probation is 
primarily for corrective purposes.29 By the 1970s, however, critics 
objected to the system. Complainants alleged that the 
indeterminate structure led to unappealing results, such as too 
lenient sentences for certain offenses, disparities in sentences 
among similarly situated offenders, discrimination against 
 24. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The 
Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 
225 (1993) (“From the beginning of the Republic, federal judges were entrusted with wide 
sentencing discretion—a fact that proponents of mandatory guidelines have been 
reluctant to acknowledge.”). 
 25. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, § 2, 36 Stat. 819, 819.  
 26. Stith & Koh, supra note 24, at 226. 
 27. See Frank O. Bowman, III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear of Judging and the 
State of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 299, 304 (2000) (“[T]he 
system assumed that judges, expert in the law and the social sciences and seasoned by 
the experience of sentencing many defendants, would choose penalties that maximized 
the rehabilitative chances of offenders.”); Stith & Koh, supra note 24, at 227 (“The 
motivating rationale for the movement toward indeterminacy and parole was the 
rehabilitation of prisoners.”). 
 28. See Ely Aharonson, Determinate Sentencing and American Exceptionalism: The 
Underpinnings and Effects of Cross-National Differences in the Regulation of Sentencing 
Discretion, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 165 (2013) (explaining that judicial and 
parole authorities were trusted to tailor each penalty to the individual offender). 
 29. See Horwitz, supra note 20, at 754, 756–58 (noting that the “historically 
intended purpose” of probation is rehabilitation and reviewing the history of probation 
and the rehabilitative ideal). Though Horwitz also recognizes that probation has shifted to 
being seen as a punishment in and of itself. See id. at 762. 
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minority defendants, and uncertainty in release decisions.30 
Equally important was the newly adopted assumption across the 
country that the rehabilitation model was fundamentally flawed. 
The infamous Martinson Report, which purportedly denounced 
rehabilitative programming as ineffective, was touted with the 
slogan “Nothing Works” in terms of reducing recidivism.31 In its 
place, the country’s politicians, with the widespread approval of 
the public, embarked in the 1980s on a tough-on-crime agenda 
that emphasized the punishment philosophies of deterrence and 
retribution.32  
This disenchantment with any rehabilitative potential of 
criminal offenders likely fueled the nationwide belief that only 
prison terms could be sufficiently punitive and possess the ability 
to control crime rates.33 A sentencing policy analyst reflects on 
the impact the get-tough policies had on the American prison 
population: “[T]he last [forty] years have seen nothing less than a 
tectonic shift. Incarceration has moved from the option of last 
resort for the most recalcitrant individuals to the predominant 
public policy model of addressing crime. Consequently, the prison 
population has expanded exponentially.”34 The number of federal 
and state prisoners increased more than threefold between 1980 
and today, with a current count at just under 2.25 million 
imprisoned.35 
The situation has led critics to declare that the United 
States is a country of “mass incarceration.”36 While certainly the 
states collectively are mainly responsible,37 federal sentencing 
 30. Stith & Koh, supra note 24, at 227–28 (noting that such criticisms emerged as 
early as the 1950s, but that “[b]y the mid-1970s, there existed a large and growing 
academic literature critical of indeterminate sentencing and parole”).  
 31. See Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison 
Reform, PUB. INT., Spring 1974, at 22, 48–50 (“Do all of these studies lead us irrevocably to 
the conclusion that nothing works, that we haven’t the faintest clue about how to 
rehabilitate offenders and reduce recidivism?”). The author later essentially rescinded this 
infamous conclusion. Robert Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution 
Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 243, 252–54 (1979). 
 32. Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America, 1975–2025, in 42 CRIME AND JUSTICE IN 
AMERICA, 1975–2025, at 141, 159–60 (Michael Tonry ed., 2013). 
 33. Joshua C. Cochran, Daniel P. Mears & William D. Bales, Assessing the 
Effectiveness of Correctional Sanctions, J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY, Aug. 13, 2013, at 
1, 2–3, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10940-013-9205-2/fulltext.html. 
 34. King, supra note 21, at 48. 
 35. Prison Reform: An Unlikely Alliance of Left and Right, ECONOMIST, Aug. 17, 
2013, at 23, 23. 
 36. See Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 
426 (2013). 
 37. See E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2012—ADVANCE COUNTS 7 tbl.6 (2013), available at 
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policy is also a major contributor to the problem of mass 
incarceration. The federal government in recent decades has 
achieved a record every year for the number of people 
incarcerated in its prisons.38 Figure 2 graphically represents the 
number of sentenced prisoners in the custody of federal 
authorities over time. By the end of 2011, there were almost 
200,000 sentenced inmates in the federal system.39  
Figure 2: Federal Sentenced Prisoners40 
The increase in numbers of defendants sentenced is not 
explained merely by a growing general population. Figure 3 
shows the increasing rate of persons sentenced to prison in the 
federal system as a measure of the overall national population. 
Clearly, federal incarceration has far outpaced population growth 
in America. 
 
  
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p12ac.pdf (revealing that state penal systems 
accounted for 1,315,817 of the 1,512,391 total U.S. sentenced prisoners in 2012). 
 38. Adelman, supra note 1, at 296. 
 39. The 2011 number excludes pretrial detainees, immigration detainees who are 
not criminally sentenced, and District of Columbia prisoners. 
 40. Data derived from E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, SENTENCED PRISONERS UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF STATE OR FEDERAL 
CORRECTIONAL AUTHORITIES, DECEMBER 31, 1978–2012 (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/nps/ 
resources/documents/QT_sentjur_tot.xlsx. The 1978–2000 numbers include federal and 
District of Columbia prisoners sentenced to more than a year but exclude pretrial 
detainees and immigration detainees not otherwise sentenced. The 2001–2012 numbers 
do not take into account District of Columbia prisoners. 
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Figure 3: Federally Sentenced Defendants per 100,000 
U.S. Residents41 
The federal justice system’s contribution to mass incarceration 
in the country is evident, as well, in the fact that it now comprises 
the largest prisoner population in the country, despite the 
expectation in our federalist system that the states are the primary 
criminal justice jurisdictions.42 Figure 4 presents a comparative 
ranking of the top twelve prison populations in America. 
Figure 4: Sentenced Prisoners in 12 Largest U.S. 
Prison Populations, 201143 
 41. Data derived from E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, IMPRISONMENT RATE OF SENTENCED PRISONERS UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF 
STATE OR FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL AUTHORITIES PER 100,000 U.S. RESIDENTS, DECEMBER 
31, 1978–2012 (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/nps/resources/documents/QT_imp%20rate_ 
tot.xlsx. 
 42. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (“Under our federal 
system, the ‘States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal 
law.’” (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 43. CARSON & GOLINELLI, supra note 37, at 7 tbl.6. 
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Combined, the federal custodial population itself is larger 
than the prison populations of all European countries other than 
Russia.44 Explaining the numbers depicted in Figures 1–4 is not 
limited to the fundamental change in sentencing philosophy from 
a theoretical perspective. Statutory reforms and critical policy 
choices of an administrative agency created to guide sentencing 
decisions are highly relevant as well. Embracing the new crime 
control ideology, Congress almost four decades ago adopted 
sentencing reforms, which included establishing this agency. 
The most dramatic congressional reform specified a 
mandatory system of guidelines that were meant to systematize 
sentencing outcomes, principally by restraining judicial 
discretion.45 Aptly titled, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
(Reform Act) instituted a guidelines system to be engineered 
under the auspices of a newly created agency named the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission (the Commission or Sentencing 
Commission).46 This Article next addresses the roles that 
Congress and the Commission may have played in the significant 
trends, as graphically depicted earlier in Figures 1–3, of a 
declining rate of nonprison sentences, a climbing federal prison 
population, and an increasing rate of federally sentenced 
defendants, respectively. 
B. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
In the body of the Reform Act, Congress charged the 
Commission with the responsibility of promulgating presumptive 
 44. Compare supra Figure 4, with PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND 
BARS IN AMERICA 2008, at 35 tbl.A-7 (2008), available at http://www.pewstates.org/ 
uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2008/one%20in%20100.pdf. 
 45. I have referred to the system before as McSentencing, as in the 
McDonaldization of federal sentencing. The contention is that the Guidelines operate to 
commodify federal sentences by producing uniform outcomes through discrete 
quantifications of harm while reducing individualized and humanized assessments of 
culpability. See generally Melissa Hamilton, McSentencing: Mass Federal Sentencing and 
the Law of Unintended Consequences, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2315187 (arguing that “the federal criminal justice model as 
framed by the reform legislation is akin to McSentencing . . . entail[ing] mass sentencing 
on a scale that aggrandizes mass sentencing procedures while downgrading the values of 
individuality, creativity, and even humanization” and applying “the four tenets of 
McDonaldization”—predictability, calculability, efficiency, and control—to federal 
sentencing reforms). 
 46. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, § 217(a), 98 
Stat. 1987, 2017–26 (providing for the establishment of the Sentencing Commission and 
its power to promulgate sentencing guidelines). At the same time, Congress passed a 
truth-in-sentencing statute to prospectively abolish parole. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(a) (2012). 
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Sentencing Guidelines.47 The Commission-instituted Guidelines 
were intended to be essentially binding on the courts, though a 
judge was granted limited discretion to depart if there was an 
aggravating or mitigating factor in the case that the Commission 
had not adequately considered when formulating the 
Guidelines.48 At the same time, Congress outlined certain factors 
that should be considered in determining a reasonable sentence 
for a convicted defendant. These factors, codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a), include the recommended punishment range set by the 
Sentencing Guidelines and the Commission’s policy statements; 
the nature and circumstances of the offense; the history and 
characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence 
imposed considering the seriousness of the offense, retribution, 
deterrence, protecting the public, and the offender’s 
rehabilitative needs; and the need to avoid unwarranted 
sentencing disparities among similarly situated offenders.49  
Despite the Guidelines initially being intended as 
substantially compulsory, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered 
them advisory in nature in the seminal case of United States v. 
Booker in 2005.50 In that case, the Court found that the federal 
determinative sentencing system operated in an unconstitutional 
manner.51 Bestowing advisory status was the Supreme Court’s 
remedial fix for the constitutional violation.52 Yet the Booker fix 
did not return to the judiciary the wide discretion that existed 
pre-Guidelines. In a series of cases since then, the Supreme 
Court has reaffirmed that federal judges are significantly 
circumscribed by the Commission’s Guidelines and policies, 
albeit alongside considerations of the other statutory 
Section 3553(a) sentencing factors.53 
Based on Booker and its progeny, as well as on the 
Guidelines’ based instructions, the current process of selecting a 
particular punishment generally involves a series of steps. The 
 47. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1).  
 48. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). The Guidelines incorporated this provision. U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (2013). 
 49. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
 50. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
 51. The Court ruled that the mandatory sentencing system violated defendants’ 
Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial by requiring judges, rather than juries, to make 
determinations of fact that would enhance the punishment for defendants’ crimes. See id. 
at 226–27, 244–45 
 52. Id. at 245.  
 53. See Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2080 (2013) (discussing how 
subsequent cases “clarified the role the Guidelines play in sentencing procedures, both at 
the district court level and when sentences are reviewed on appeal”). 
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sentencing judge first calculates the base offense level from the 
applicable offense guideline.54 She does this by determining the 
initial base offense level and then making appropriate 
adjustments provided by relevant Guidelines to reach a final 
base offense level.55 These adjustments are generally facts 
related to the offense or characteristics related to the offender 
that the Commission perceives as aggravating or mitigating 
culpability.56 Second, this point total, together with a criminal 
history score, is translated through the principle Guidelines grid 
into a sentencing range (such as 24–30 months).57 Next, the 
judge considers whether any of the general departure standards 
should be applied, such as a reward for substantial assistance to 
authorities.58 Thus, the Guidelines provide a framework, or 
starting point, for any sentencing decision.59 According to the 
Supreme Court, correctly calculated Guidelines sentencing 
ranges normally provide a “rough approximation of sentences 
that might achieve [Section] 3553(a)’s objectives” in a mine-run 
case.60 This is because the ranges generally represent decisions 
by the Commission’s “professional staff with appropriate 
expertise”61 after “careful study based on extensive empirical 
evidence derived from the review of thousands of individual 
sentencing decisions” nationwide.62 
In sum, the Booker remedy means that, while a court must 
give thoughtful consideration to the Guidelines, it must also be 
mindful of whether a Guidelines-based sentence properly 
encapsulates the Section 3553(a) statutory sentencing factors.63 
 54. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). 
 55. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(1)–(2) (2013). 
 56. See id. §§ 3A1.1–3C1.4 (providing for adjustments to sentencing levels based on 
factors such as the status of the victim, aggravating or mitigating roles in the offense, 
obstructing the administration of justice, or the commission of the offense while on 
release). 
 57. Id. § 1B1.1(a)(6)–(7); id. ch. 5, pt. A. 
 58. See id. §§ 1B1.1(b), 5H1.1–.12, 5K1.1–.2 (instructing courts to consider 
departures from the guideline ranges for specific offender characteristics such as 
education, family ties, and responsibilities, as well as for substantial assistance to 
authorities and other grounds).  
 59. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49. 
 60. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007). “The term ‘mine-run’ deserves 
to be Googled and then forgotten. Think run-of-the-mill.” United States v. Grober, 595 F. 
Supp. 2d 382, 403 n.12 (D.N.J. 2008). 
 61. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108–09 (2007) (quoting United States 
v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
 62. Gall, 552 U.S. at 46. 
 63. Rita, 551 U.S. at 358 (stating that a sentencer’s “reasoned sentencing judgment 
rest[s] upon an effort to filter the Guidelines’ general advice through § 3553(a)’s list of 
factors”). 
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Thus, the fourth step is for the judge to reflect upon these 
statutory sentencing factors in determining whether a within-
Guidelines or, alternatively, a non-Guidelines sentence is 
proper.64 In the final decision, the sentencer sets a parsimonious 
punishment, i.e., one that is “sufficient, but not greater than 
necessary” to accomplish the statutory sentencing goals.65 
The foregoing represents the basics for current federal 
sentencing decisions. But it does not directly account for the 
sharp decline in nonprison sentences, as reflected in Figure 1. As 
will be explained below in Part II.C, a primary explanation can 
be traced to the initial—and currently prevailing—policy choices 
of the Commission to presume a term of imprisonment, while at 
the same time substantially limit the availability of alternatives 
that do not also include a prison stay. The Commission’s policy 
decisions here were not a foregone conclusion in terms of whether 
they complied with Congress’s intent. As with many legislative 
acts which are the products of bipartisan compromise, the history 
of the Reform Act yields various—sometimes somewhat 
conflicting—perspectives.66 Certainly, the philosophical 
preference for retribution and deterrence over rehabilitation at 
the time might suggest an intention to focus on imprisonment. 
But does this necessarily mean that Congress as a whole desired 
for the then-rate of about half of sentences not including 
imprisonment to drop so dramatically? Did legislators generally 
come to feel that probation or a fine, for instance, failed to 
constitute a sufficiently punitive sentence for criminal conduct as 
a general rule? There is considerable language and sentiment in 
the Reform Act itself and the legislative reports accompanying 
the reform initiatives to support the notion that Congress did not 
actually mean to repudiate alternative sentences.  
In fact, Congress expressed a preference for the judicious 
and conservative use of prison beds. The Reform Act itself states 
that “sentencing decisions should be designed to ensure that 
prison resources are, first and foremost, reserved for those 
violent and serious criminal offenders who pose the most 
dangerous threat to society.”67 Further, “in cases of nonviolent 
and nonserious offenders, the interests of society as a whole as 
 64. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–50. 
 65. Id. at 43–44 (citations omitted). 
 66. See, e.g., Stith & Koh, supra note 24, at 258–66 (relating the contentious history 
of the Act during its development in the 1980s, with particularly conflicting positions 
emerging between the Senate and the House Judiciary Committee on the issue of 
sentencing reform). 
 67. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 note (2012). 
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well as individual victims of crime can continue to be served 
through the imposition of alternative sentences, such as 
restitution and community service.”68 Indeed, Congress 
reiterated these sentiments in a specific mandate to the 
Sentencing Commission, instructing it to  
insure that the guidelines reflect the general 
appropriateness of imposing a sentence other than 
imprisonment in cases in which the defendant is a first 
offender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence 
or an otherwise serious offense, and the general 
appropriateness of imposing a term of imprisonment on a 
person convicted of a crime of violence that results in 
serious bodily injury.69 
The Legislature was clearly concerned with avoiding prison 
overpopulation, indicating in the legislation that prison capacity 
at that time posed an “impending crisis” such that “available 
[f]ederal prison space must be treated as a scarce resource in the 
sentencing of criminal defendants.”70 The Commission was, 
therefore, instructed that one of its duties was to formulate 
guidelines to minimize the likelihood that the prison population 
would exceed capacity.71 
A Senate Report underlying the legislation represents that 
committee members actually intended that probation and 
intermediate sanctions be available more often than they had 
been before the Guidelines.72 One of Congress’s chief complaints 
about sentencing practices before the Guidelines was that a judge 
might invoke “a longer term than would ordinarily be 
appropriate simply because there were no available alternatives 
that served the purposes he sought to achieve with a long 
sentence.”73 Congress, though, was not focused just on the length 
of prison terms; it expressed concern about the overuse of prison 
as the typical type of sentence.74 The Senate Committee Report 
 68. Id. 
 69. 28 U.S.C. § 994(j). 
 70. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 note. 
 71. 28 U.S.C. § 994(g). 
 72. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 50, 59, 67, 172–76 (1983) (criticizing the previous lack 
of guidance on nonprison sentences and emphasizing probation as a type of sentence to be 
considered when evaluating defendants and striving to meet the purposes of sentencing 
while insuring the most appropriate use of penal and correctional facilities). 
 73. Id. at 50. 
 74. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1017, at 37 (1984) (“[D]eficiency of current [f]ederal practice is 
the misuse of the nation's limited and expensive prison facilities. Federal prisons, like 
their State counterparts, are currently overcrowded. Too often prison is used for people 
who could just as effectively be punished through nonincarcerative sentences. Prison 
should be used in those cases where incapacitation or deterrence demand it, or where the 
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observed that the law was not then “particularly flexible in 
providing the sentencing judge with a range of options,” such 
that “a term of imprisonment may be imposed in some cases in 
which it would not be imposed if better alternatives were 
available.”75 The Senate Report reflected further that the 
only type of sentence for which current law provides a full 
range of options is the term of imprisonment. This probably 
results in too much reliance on terms of imprisonment 
when other types of sentences would serve the purpose of 
sentencing equally well without the degree of restriction on 
liberty that results from imprisonment.76 
To rectify this gap, the Senate Committee expected that the 
new system should “assure the availability of a full range of 
sentencing options from which to select the most appropriate 
sentence in a particular case.”77 
All of this language strongly undermines the theory that 
Congress intended prison to be anything akin to a presumptive 
sentence. Still, the legislative committee reports differ as to whether 
an alternative sentence should be the default. Addressing the 
question about whether there ought to be any presumption on the 
type of sentence issued, for instance, the Senate Report concluded 
that “the best course is to provide no presumption either for or 
against probation as opposed to imprisonment, but to allow the 
Sentencing Commission and, under [the Commission’s] guidelines, 
the courts, the full exercise of informed discretion in tailoring 
sentences to the circumstances of individual cases.”78 In contrast, 
the House Report stated that its committee “believes that it is best, 
whenever possible, to use effective alternatives to imprisonment” 
such that judges at the initial stage of sentencing should “consider 
and reject all nonprison alternatives before imposing a sentence of 
incarceration.”79 The Reform Act itself is neutral on the issue, 
merely permitting a sentence of imprisonment, probation, or fine,80 
and instructing judges in all cases to consider all kinds of sentences 
available.81 
seriousness of the crime is such that nonprison sentences would cause public disrespect 
for the law; yet the overcrowded condition of our institutions makes prison less available 
in those cases where it is needed.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 75. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 50. 
 76. Id. at 59. 
 77. Id. at 39. 
 78. Id. at 91. 
 79. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1017, at 37, 41. But see id. at 253 (dissenting statement) 
(complaining that the bill fails to sufficiently promote punishment as a primary goal). 
 80. 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b) (2012). 
 81. Id. § 3553(a)(3). 
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The aversion to rehabilitation at the time does not frustrate the 
conclusion that Congress accepted that nonincarcerative sentences 
should be given in many, arguably most, cases. The Senate 
Committee advocated that imprisonment was not the “only form of 
sentence that may effectively carry deterrent or punitive weight. It 
may very often be that release on probation under conditions 
designed to fit the particular situation will adequately satisfy any 
appropriate deterrent or punitive purpose.”82 
Notwithstanding all of this evidence of Congress’s rejection 
of an incarceration-focused policy, as the next Subpart will 
explore, the Sentencing Commission fully embraced, and wrote 
the Guidelines to dictate, a prison-by-default position. 
C. The Sentencing Commission as Policy Driver 
The Sentencing Commission early on definitively established 
imprisonment as the presumptive sentence across the board. To be 
clear, the Guidelines do allow for a nonprison sentence.83 Yet, they 
also operate in various ways to substantially discourage such a 
result. The availability of a Guidelines-based alternative to prison is 
extremely limited, and when it might in the relatively few cases be 
allowed, the Commission has provided little guidance to judges in 
answering what might be the first relevant question in sentencing: 
the in/out decision. This Subpart will address these contentions and 
attempt to explain how the Commission appears to substantiate its 
position to privilege prison terms. Then consideration of other 
potential sources for the substantial ratchet up of prison sentences 
following the Guidelines’ implementation will follow, along with a 
discussion of the available statistical evidence that may confirm or 
refute those alternative sources. It is noted that the empirical 
support provided herein varies by year based on the purpose of the 
reference and, importantly, the availability of relevant data. 
1. Guidelines Policies Preferring Imprisonment. Under the 
Guidelines, prison sentences dominate. Indeed, alternatives, 
including straight probation, are never a default in the sense that 
prison is an option in every case, even for minor misdemeanors 
perpetrated by first time offenders.84 The Commission determined 
 82. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 92. 
 83. 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(1)(4)(d) 
(2013). 
 84. See Nora V. Demleitner, Replacing Incarceration: The Need for Dramatic Change, 22 
FED. SENT’G REP. 1, 1 (2009) (noting that imprisonment “rhetorically dominates, since all other 
sanctions are merely ‘alternatives’”). Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2X5.2 
(setting forth a “base offense level” of six for defendants convicted of Class A misdemeanors for 
                                            
Do Not Delete  4/19/2014  2:00 PM 
1288 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [51:5 
that the availability of a nonprison sentence would be governed by 
zones, which are superimposed on a single grid.85 This grid is the 
nucleus of the Guidelines system. Basically, the grid provides for 
ranges of time, in months, of (purportedly) appropriate prison 
sentences. Indeed, this table is clearly labeled such that the ranges 
control the length of imprisonment. The grid contains a horizontal 
axis that corresponds to the defendant’s final criminal history score 
(using an ordinal scale from I–VI). The vertical axis relates to the 
defendant’s final offense level (1–43). Thus, there are 258 cells in 
the grid. The grid is further subdivided into four zones using an 
alphabetical hierarchy, from Zone A to D, using an ordinal scale. 
The Guidelines differentiate between zones for purposes of 
sentencing options, as in types of sentence allowed.  
Zone A expressly permits probation or a fine-only sentence 
and all of its ranges include, but are not limited to, the number 
zero to represent the option of requiring no prison time.86 Zone 
B allows for a probation sentence as long as there is also a 
community confinement restriction, such as home detention, 
halfway house, or drug rehabilitation facility.87 Probation or 
fine-only sentences are technically impermissible for 
defendants falling into Zones C and D.88 One might surmise 
there to be no thumb on the scale favoring a prison term 
considering two zones permit alternatives to prison while an 
equal two zones do not. Together, though, Zones C and D 
comprise the bulk of the cells. Today, 81% of the cells fall into 
Zones C and D.89 Actual sentencing data, perhaps 
coincidentally, almost replicate this number. For fiscal years 
2006–2012, 83% of defendants were delegated to Zones C and 
D.90 Thus, during such timeframe, pursuant to the Guidelines, 
approximately only one out of six defendants were technically 
even eligible for a nonprison sentence. This skew exists despite 
the fact that Congress statutorily authorizes judges to impose 
probation for numerous offenses, i.e., any offense with a 
the court to use in determining an appropriate sentence), with id. ch. 5, pt. A (setting forth zero 
to six months of incarceration as an appropriate sentence of a first-time offender with a “base 
offense level” of six). The Guidelines apply to Class A misdemeanors, which can include less 
serious offenses such as gambling and trespass, but do not apply to Class B or Class C 
Misdemeanors. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.9. 
 85. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A. 
 86. Id.; id. §§ 5B1.1(a)(1) & cmt. n.1(A), 5C1.1(b) cmt. n.2. 
 87. Id. § 5B1.1(a)(2) & cmt. n.1(B). 
 88. Id. §§ 5B1.1 cmt. n.2, 5C1.1(d), (f). 
 89. Id. ch. 5, pt. A. 
 90. Data compiled from U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2006–2012 SOURCEBOOK OF 
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.16 (2007–2013). 
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statutory maximum below twenty-five years unless precluded 
by statute for the offense.91 
Another avenue leading toward a presumption of prison is 
the fact that the Commission based the initial Guidelines and 
the recommended sentencing ranges on a distorted vision of 
past sentencing practices. More specifically, the Commission 
chose to analyze in depth those past sentences in which a term 
of imprisonment was given and only those that went to trial,92 
though acknowledging that, at the time, 85% of cases were 
pleas which often attracted reduced sentences.93 The 
Commission candidly explained that it designed the Guidelines 
to recommend sentences within a narrow range, using as 
anchors the average time served under prior law in which 
sentences of imprisonment were imposed and the defendants 
were first offenders.94 The sentencing table from the very 
beginning thus excluded from its recommended “norms” 
approximately 50% of all cases—that is, the numerous cases in 
which judges had believed it appropriate to impose probation 
or some other nonprison sentence.95 The anchors used likewise 
did not properly represent average defendants in that first 
offenders who had previously received prison sentences prior 
to the promulgation of the Guidelines, in light of the high rate 
of probation sentences overall, likely represented more serious 
offenders.96 Further, contrary to the Commission’s assertion 
that the initial Sentencing Guidelines were largely reliant 
upon the averages of past sentencing practices,97 they clearly 
 91. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3561(a), 3559(a) (2012). 
 92. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 23 (1987). 
 93. Id. at 48. 
 94. Id. at 22–23. 
 95. Compare supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text (explaining that the 
Commission only used sentences where a term of imprisonment resulted when developing the 
sentencing table), with BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL CASES, 1980–87, at 7 app. tbl. (1989), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/ 
pub/pdf/fcc8087.pdf (showing that half of the federal defendants sentenced in 1985 were given 
nonprison sentences). 
 96. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1985 
(1990), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cfjs85.pdf (explaining that, in 1985, first 
offenders were much less likely to receive a sentence of incarceration than those with a 
criminal history and showing that those convicted of violent offenses were much more likely to 
receive a sentence of incarceration than those convicted of less serious offenses).  
 97. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. n.5 (2013) 
(“[The Commission] relied upon pre-guidelines sentencing practice as revealed by its own 
statistical analyses.”). See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 92, at 17–19, 23 
(discussing how the Commission utilized “[s]tandard multivariate statistics . . . to draw 
inferences about the sentences received”). 
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did not replicate these averages.98 Thus, it has been suggested 
that the Commission had not created Sentencing Guidelines 
addressing a spectrum of alternatives, but a narrower version 
representing merely prison guidelines.99 
In addition, further reflecting a prison bias, the Commission 
has unfortunately chosen not to provide substantive guidance on 
the in/out decision.100 This continues to be surprising considering 
Congress expressly directed it to do so in the Reform Act 
legislation101 in order to assist judges who are statutorily required 
to ascertain if a probation sentence is statutorily permissible.102 
Congress clearly contemplated that the “sentencing guidelines will 
recommend to the sentencing judge an appropriate kind and range 
of sentence for a given category of offense committed by a given 
category of offender.”103 The Senate Report accompanying the 
legislation also forthrightly indicates that this was considered an 
important mission for the agency: 
The guidelines are required to provide guidance for the judge 
in determining whether to sentence a convicted defendant to 
probation, to pay a fine, or to a term of imprisonment. This 
guidance may prove to be one of the most important parts of 
the guidelines process, since current law provides no guidance 
or mechanism for guidance to judges on this crucial decision, 
leading to considerable unwarranted disparity which there is 
no mechanism to correct.104 
The House Report is in agreement, likewise referring to the 
in/out decision as “the most fundamental decision of sentencing” 
and expressing that the Guidelines should advise judges on this 
specific determination.105 
 98. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Prioritizing Policy Before Practice After Booker, 18 
FED. SENT’G REP. 167, 167 (2006) (“[T]he Commission’s adherence to past practice was far 
from uniform.”). 
 99. Herbert J. Hoelter, Sentencing Alternatives—Back to the Future, 22 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 53, 53 (2009). 
 100. See Thomas W. Hillier, II, Linking Judicial Sentences to Congressional 
Purposes, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 24, 24–25 (1995) (explaining the need and advocating for an 
“in/out” guideline); Charlie E. Varnon, Restoring Probation, Parsimony and Purposes to 
the Sentencing Reform Act, 5 FED. SENT’G REP. 217, 217–18 (1993) (criticizing the lack of 
Guidelines that specifically recommend a fine or probation). 
 101. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1)(A) (2012) (instructing the Commission to promulgate a 
guideline that would permit a sentencing judge to determine whether to impose a sentence of 
probation, a fine, or a term of imprisonment). 
 102. 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a). 
 103. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 51 (1983) (emphasis added). 
 104. Id. at 163–64 (emphasis added). 
 105. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1017, at 102 (1984) (noting, too, that some state commissions 
unfortunately focus instead on guiding the length of prison sentences rather than the kind of 
sentence). 
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As has been recognized, “[d]espite these clear directives, no 
chapter, or even section of the Guidelines points the sentencing 
court to factors that should be considered in answering the 
threshold question of whether to imprison.”106 Considering that 
Congress is stridently interested in fostering nationwide 
uniformity in sentencing practices, this lapse is curious in that 
the in/out decision is a critical threshold question, the resolution 
of which can certainly cause disparity in sentencing practices.107 
The Guidelines also, contrary to congressional mandate,108 fail 
to provide factors for judges to contemplate in considering the 
length of any nonprison sentence. There exists a grid for prison 
sentences, but no corresponding grids for alternative sentences. 
Thus, instead of the initial question the Guidelines should assist 
with—What type of sentence is appropriate?—the Guidelines 
merely ask—How long of a prison term is appropriate?109 The 
Senate Committee had acknowledged that refined Guidelines with 
ranges for alternative sentences would likely be difficult but 
suggested the two-year implementation timeframe would be 
sufficient for the agency to complete the assigned task.110 In its 
report, the Senate Committee also noted that congressional staffers 
had tried to be helpful in this regard by listing a variety of offender 
characteristics, from which the Commission was instructed to 
review and, then, choose those factors that should be relevant to the 
court’s decision on what type of sentence to impose.111 
The Legislature, in fact, reiterated these goals two years 
later. A House Report supporting an amendment to the 
Commission’s responsibility in 1986 indicated the Legislature’s 
expectation that the Commission would be “directed to issue 
sentencing guidelines that address the type of punishment to 
impose (probation, a fine, imprisonment); the appropriate 
amount of a fine, and the appropriate length of a term of 
probation or of imprisonment.”112 Despite such congressional 
expectations, the Commission chose to focus almost exclusively 
 106. Ellen C. Brotman, Make Probation a Real Option at Sentencing, 23 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 257, 257 (2011). 
 107. Id. at 257–58; Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 884 (1990). 
 108. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1)(B) (2012) (directing the Commission to issue a 
guideline courts can use to determine the “appropriate length of a term of probation”); S. 
REP. NO. 98-225, at 165.  
 109. Adelman, supra note 1, at 310–11. 
 110. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 169. 
 111. Id. at 171. 
 112. H.R. REP. NO. 99-614, at 3 (1986). 
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on promoting prison sentences.113 In light of the various 
proclamations by Congress preferring alternative sentences 
provided above, one may wonder about the Commission’s strong 
stance otherwise. 
Certain philosophical rationales may explain the agency’s 
bias against alternatives.114 One is that the Commission initially 
referred to straight probationary sentences as not sufficiently 
punitive, indeed, declaring them “very lenient.”115 A 
commentator has observed that the Commission’s “limitations on 
judge[s’] choices in the types of sentences to be imposed [were] 
part of a larger shift away from probationary and alternative 
sentences, again due to the increasingly widespread belief that a 
punitive and severe punishment could only be satisfied through 
imprisonment.”116 Indeed, in its statistical measures of adherence 
to the Guidelines, the Commission today counts a probationary 
sentence as a noncompliant, 100% downward variance if the 
Guidelines minimum in the case was greater than zero 
months.117 Critics contend, as well, that the Commission wanted 
 113. Michael E. Smith, Designing and Implementing Noncustodial Penal Sanctions: 
What Purposes Will Real Alternatives Serve?, 4 FED. SENT’G REP. 27, 27 (1991) (“[G]rid-
based guideline systems are initially hostile to all penal measures except incarceration—
the penal measure which, largely by default, has become our archetype, our all-purpose 
sanction, the standard of exchange in the punishment market.”). 
 114. See Paul L. Seave, Rehabilitation, Non-Recidivism, and Probation: The 
Sentencing Commission’s Unwanted Stepchildren, 5 FED. SENT’G REP. 223, 223 (1993) 
(describing the Commission’s “crime control” philosophy and disbelief in the effectiveness 
of probation as theoretical justifications for the focus on imprisonment in the Guidelines). 
 115. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 92, at 17. 
 116. Hoelter, supra note 99, at 54; see also Varnon, supra note 100, at 217 (observing 
that the Commission thought only imprisonment could deter or punish). The Commission 
has admitted its belief that “the definite prospect of prison, even though the term may be 
short, will serve as a significant deterrent, particularly when compared with pre-
guidelines practice where probation, not prison, was the norm.” U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(1)(4)(d) (2013). But the Commission offered no evidence 
to support this presumption, and available evidence is to the contrary. See Daniel J. 
Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the 
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1707–08 (1992) (noting that the Guidelines 
Manual did not provide support for the assertion that probation practice was ineffective); 
see, e.g., VALERIE WRIGHT, SENTENCING PROJECT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
EVALUATING CERTAINTY VS. SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT 4, 6–7, 9 (2010), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/deterrence%20briefing%20.pdf (analyzing the weak 
deterrent effects of increasing the severity of sentences); David Weisburd, Elin Waring & 
Ellen Chayet, Specific Deterrence in a Sample of Offenders Convicted of White-Collar 
Crimes, 33 CRIMINOLOGY 587, 589, 597–98, 601 (1995) (finding no difference in deterrence 
of white-collar offenders, presumably the most rational offenders, between imprisonment 
and probation). 
 117. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED 
STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING pt. A, at 101 (2012), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Repor
ts/Booker_Reports/2012_Booker/Part_A.pdf#page=5. 
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to abolish probation as it generally adopted a pro-prosecution 
bias catering to the “law-and-order” members of Congress.118 
It is as if the Commission believes there is a significant 
divide in terms of punishment between prison and alternatives. 
Congress, to the contrary, considered that a term of 
imprisonment was not “necessarily a more stringent sentence 
than a term of probation with restrictive conditions and a heavy 
fine.”119 The Senate Report indicates that larger fines, probation 
with conditions, and other alternatives to all or part of a prison 
term, such as community service or intermittent confinement, 
should be used more often.120 The committee’s expectation was 
that it would be the sentencing judge’s responsibility to 
determine whether the purposes of sentencing would best be 
served by probation or imprisonment,121 except that the 
Legislature directed that imprisonment itself was not 
appropriate to achieve the purpose of rehabilitation.122 
The Commission’s stance in subverting the role of nonprison 
sentences as a sufficient punishment is also in conflict with 
congressional will, which viewed probation as a “form of sentence 
with conditions.”123 Again, in the Senate Report accompanying 
the Reform Act, the committee indicated there should be no  
artificial line between imprisonment and probation, forcing 
the sentencing guidelines system and the judges to formulate 
sentencing policy that assumes that a term of imprisonment, 
no matter how brief, is necessarily a more stringent sentence 
than a term of probation with restrictive conditions and a 
heavy fine. Such an assumption would be a roadblock to the 
development of sensible comprehensive sentencing policy.124 
To this end, the legislative committee affirmatively 
encouraged the “fashioning of conditions of probation in order to 
make probation a useful alternative to a term of 
imprisonment.”125 
Another explanation for the Commission’s stance returns us to 
preferences on sentencing philosophies. As indicated earlier, a 
 118. Adelman, supra note 1, at 302; Michael Tonry, The Success of Judge Frankel’s 
Sentencing Commission, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 713, 717 (1993). 
 119. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 55 (1983). 
 120. See id. at 50, 59 (speculating that imprisonment may be imposed in some cases 
because of a lack of alternatives and stating that Congress provided for those 
alternatives). 
 121. Id. at 92, 119; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551(b), 3561–3564 (2012).  
 122. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a). 
 123. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 59. 
 124. Id. at 55. 
 125. Id. at 59. 
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philosophical change of heart was a foundational push for 
sentencing reform as a general matter. But in the legislation itself, 
Congress did not direct that sentencing policy should prospectively 
ignore rehabilitation. Instead, the legislation outlined four main 
sentencing philosophies—deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, 
and rehabilitation—yet did not choose to elevate any one of them.126 
In its report, the Senate Committee seems to discount rehabilitation 
but only in the context of a prison setting, which helps explain the 
concurrent abolition of the parole system.127 Otherwise, the report 
states expressly that in the legislative debates regarding reform, 
the suggestion to eliminate rehabilitation was proffered and then 
explicitly rejected.128 The Sentencing Commission, however, 
adopted deterrence and retribution as its main philosophies, after 
conceding that its initial commissioners could not agree on which of 
those two prevailed.129 Notice, though, this stance ignores 
rehabilitation. And the Guidelines so promulgated, with a default 
position of prison and a failure to adequately guide decisions on 
nonprison sentences, illustrate such partiality. In support thereof, 
the Commission can correctly point to a congressional edict that 
“the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence 
to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the 
defendant.”130 Critics, though, claim that the Commission has 
incorrectly interpreted such provision to apply too broadly: 
Congress did not say that imposing a sentence for 
rehabilitative purposes is inappropriate; to the contrary, it 
said a sentence to a term of imprisonment is inappropriate 
for the purpose of fostering rehabilitation in cases where 
deterrence, punishment, and incapacitation do not 
otherwise require incarceration. The Commission’s belief 
that Congress placed a low priority on rehabilitation was 
not supported by the statute or its legislative history. In 
cases where the three purposes of sentencing other than 
rehabilitation did not require prison, Congress intended 
probation to be the default sentence.131 
Actually, another provision of the Reform Act instructs that 
judges consider each defendant’s need for educational and 
treatment services when imposing a sentence, particularly when 
 126. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). 
 127. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38. 
 128. Id. at 76. 
 129. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 92, at 17. 
 130. 28 U.S.C. § 994(k). 
 131. Brotman, supra note 106, at 258 (footnote omitted). However, the Senate Report 
declined to suggest any presumption of a sentence of prison or probation. S. REP. NO. 98-
225, at 91. 
                                            
Do Not Delete  4/19/2014  2:00 PM 
2014] PRISON-BY-DEFAULT 1295 
determining whether to require any special conditions of 
probation.132 The Senate Report accompanying the Reform Act 
makes clear that rehabilitative purpose should be weighed “in 
determining whether a sanction other than a term of 
imprisonment is appropriate in a particular case.”133 In support 
of rehabilitation being a relevant and driving factor for nonprison 
sentences, Congress evidently was open to the consideration of 
personal circumstances, such as education, vocational skills, 
employment, and family and community ties, when determining 
if an alternative sentence is appropriate.134 
It is of interest how the Commission responded to Congress’s 
admonition that prison resources be reserved for serious and violent 
criminals who pose the greatest threat to society.135 The 
Commission took a position that seems to redact the characteristic 
of violence and adopted an expansive definition of which crimes 
were serious.136 Again, the Commission here noted its antagonistic 
perspective on probation. It asserted that courts had previously 
been sentencing to probation “an inappropriately high percentage of 
offenders guilty of certain economic crimes, such as theft, tax 
evasion, antitrust offenses, insider trading, fraud, and 
embezzlement, that in the Commission’s view are ‘serious.’”137 
Thus, the Commission wrote Guidelines mandating prison for many 
offenses that were then generally receiving probationary 
sentences.138 This position is in conflict with a report from a 
committee of the House of Representatives at the time of sentencing 
reform that stated one of the purposes of the legislation was to 
“encourage the development of effective alternatives to prison for 
nonviolent criminals, and to provide more severe nonprison forms of 
punishment for white-collar and corporate crime.”139 
 132. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF 
GUIDELINES SENTENCING 13 (2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_ 
Statistics/Research_Projects/Miscellaneous/15_Year_Study/15_year_study_full.pdf. 
 133. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 76–77. 
 134. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)–(e). 
 135. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 note. 
 136. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(1)(4)(d) (2013) (stating 
that the Commission considers certain crimes “serious” that previously frequently 
resulted in sentences of probation). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id.; see Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for This Age of Federal Sentencing: 
The Opportunity and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 108 
(1999) (indicating such decision had no evident basis in empirical research); see also U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 132, at 44 (explaining a substantial reason for the 
decreased use of probation following Guidelines implementation was due in large part to 
the Guidelines’ presumption of prison sentences instead of the historical tendency toward 
probation for economic crimes). 
 139. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1017, at 31 (1984). 
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The Commission itself officially acknowledged, and several 
of the original commissioners were clearly aware, the Guidelines 
would significantly reduce probationary sentences.140 One of the 
commissioners wrote that the Guidelines ensured that the 
“certainty of confinement will be dramatically increased under 
the guidelines” and that his initial statistical projection was that 
straight probation sentences would at least be halved.141 Another 
initial commissioner noted the Guidelines drafted would require 
prison except for very minor cases.142 One of them also trumpeted 
that “the significant reduction in the incidence of straight 
probation terms may be the most important innovation 
attributable directly to [C]ommission policy.”143 
The failure of guidance on nonincarcerative sentences may 
explain why the Commission itself concedes that “it is impossible 
to discern from available data the exact reasons sentencing 
courts have in mind when deciding whether to impose alternative 
sentences.”144 The pro-prison bias continues despite staff reports 
in the meantime warning that the Guidelines’ requirement of 
prison in nearly every case is unnecessary and 
counterproductive.145 Other research concurs.146 
 140. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 92, at 53; Michael K. Block & William M. 
Rhodes, Forecasting the Impact of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 
51, 52 (1989); Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key 
Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 24 n.121 (1988). 
 141. Block & Rhodes, supra note 140, at 60 tbl.1, 61. 
 142. Notice, Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 18,046, 
18,122 (May 13, 1987) (dissenting view of Comm’r Paul H. Robinson) (“Offenders under 
current practice receive sanctions other than imprisonment (e.g., fines, conditions of 
probation) in approximately 50% of the cases, yet the guidelines provide for imprisonment 
in all but the most minor cases.” (footnote omitted)). 
 143. Block & Rhodes, supra note 140, at 65–66. 
 144. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 20 (2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_ 
Statistics/Research_Projects/Alternatives/20090206_Alternatives.pdf. 
 145. See id. (“[A]lternatives to incarceration can provide a substitute for costly 
incarceration. . . . [and can] also provide those offenders opportunities by diverting them 
from prison (or reducing time spent in prison) and into programs providing the life skills 
and treatment necessary to become law-abiding and productive members of society.”); 
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SENTENCING OPTIONS UNDER THE GUIDELINES 18–19 (1996), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Working_Group_Reports/Simplification/SENT 
OPT.PDF (“Many federal offenders who do not currently qualify for alternatives have 
relatively low risks of recidivism compared to offenders in state systems and to federal 
offenders on supervised release. . . . [A]lternatives divert offenders from the criminogenic 
effects of imprisonment which include contact with more serious offenders, disruption of 
legal employment, and weakening of family ties.”).  
 146. See Laura Baber, Results-Based Framework for Post-Conviction Supervision 
Recidivism Analysis, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 2010, at 5, 7–8 & fig.5 (studying roughly 
40,000 federal offenders, finding 85% of those on probation and 76% of those on 
supervised release after a prison term remained arrest-free within the first three years of 
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The Commission’s policies regarding prison as the default 
punishment are significant contributors—though clearly not the 
sole basis—in accounting for certain additional statistical 
measures. The first is the important change in the profile of 
federally sentenced defendants in terms of the numerical ranks 
of federal prisoners and probationers as provided in Figure 5. 
The graph demonstrates significant shifts in two of the main 
subpopulations in the federal correctional system. 
Figure 5: Populations of Federal Sentenced Prisoners 
and Probationers147 
Of course, prison capacity might not be at issue if the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons released as many or more prisoners 
than were entering. But that has not occurred. As Figure 6 
illustrates, every year over the last two decades the number of 
entering federal prisoners has exceeded the number released. 
their term); Miles D. Harer, Do Guideline Sentences for Low-Risk Drug Traffickers 
Achieve Their Stated Purposes?, 7 FED. SENT’G REP. 22, 23 (1994) (“[T]he alienation, 
deteriorated family relations, and reduced employment prospects resulting from the 
extremely long removal from family and regular employment may well increase 
recidivism.”); Lynne M. Vieraitis, Tomislav V. Kovandzic & Thomas B. Marvell, The 
Criminogenic Effects of Imprisonment: Evidence from State Panel Data, 1974–2002, 6 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 589, 591–93 (2007) (finding that “imprisonment causes harm 
to prisoners” by isolating them from families and friends, making it difficult to 
successfully reenter society, and “reinforc[ing] criminal identities” through contacts with 
other criminals). 
 147. Data compiled from BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
ADULTS ON PROBATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1977–2012 (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/data/corpop11.csv; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
SENTENCED PRISONERS UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF STATE OR FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL 
AUTHORITIES, DECEMBER 31, 1978–2012, http://www.bjs.gov/nps/resources/documents/ 
QT_sentjur_tot.xlsx (counting prisoners sentenced for more than a year). 
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Figure 6: Entering and Released Federal Prisoners148 
Curiously, the Commission, then and now, seems intent on 
maintaining its prison-by-default policies, despite prison capacity 
issues.149 To its merit, the Commission admits this reality; 
however, it remains unapologetic. Instead, agency officials in 
2004 rationalized that “Congress has proven willing to 
appropriate the funds needed to expand the capacity of the 
federal prisons to the levels needed to accommodate expanded 
federal prosecution and increased sentence severity.”150 Then in 
2012, in response to a legislative hearing expressly enquiring 
about the rising costs of federal imprisonment, the Chair of the 
Commission appeared to assume little blame on the agency’s 
behalf. She principally explained overcrowding by pointing to the 
effect of mandatory minimum statutes and obliquely referring to 
 148. Data derived from E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, NUMBER OF ADMISSIONS OF SENTENCED PRISONERS TO STATE OR FEDERAL 
PRISONS, 1978–2012 (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/nps/resources/documents/QT_nps%20 
admiss_tot.xlsx (counting prisoners sentenced for more than a year) and E. ANN 
CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NUMBER OF RELEASES OF 
SENTENCED PRISONERS FROM STATE OR FEDERAL PRISONS, 1978–2012 (2013), 
http://www.bjs.gov/nps/resources/documents/QT_nps%20release_tot.xlsx (counting prisoners 
sentenced for more than a year).  
 149. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, NOTICE OF FINAL PRIORITIES 2, 4 (2013), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legal/Federal_Register_Notices/20130820_FR_Final_ 
Priorities.pdf (focusing on costs of incarceration, rather than rates of incarceration). 
Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5B1.1, 5C1.1 (1993) (setting forth the 
1993 version of the Guidelines regarding the imposition of probation and imprisonment 
terms), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5B1.1, 5C1.1 (2013) (setting forth 
the 2013 version of the Guidelines regarding the imposition of probation and 
imprisonment). 
 150. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 132, at 77. 
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the size and composition of the federal criminal docket.151 While 
she in an official capacity asked Congress to consider enacting 
specific statutes that would offer some sentencing relief, no 
additional changes to the Guidelines have yet to be offered to 
address prison overcrowding.152 
2. Alternative Sources of Prison Promotion. The thesis 
herein is not that the prison-by-default ideology is the sole 
responsibility of the Commission. Instead, the contention is that 
the expansive policies initiated by the agency render the 
Commission a likely primary party in explaining the significant 
upward spiral of prison sentences. Based on the multiple policies 
just discussed that substantively promote imprisonment in 
sentencing and the fact the Guidelines were, until Booker, 
mandatory, the fact that nonprison sentences became the 
minority just after the Guidelines’ implementation cannot be 
coincidental. The initial commissioners had intended and 
predicted such result.153 And over time the Commission has done 
little to address the imbalance. To the extent that the 
Commission consistently seems greatly concerned with 
disparities in sentencing, the commonality of prison as the type of 
sentence utilized certainly promotes the agency’s interest in 
nationwide uniformity.154 Still, it is appropriate to consider the 
potential impact of other sources in accounting for the 
substantially high likelihood today of sentences requiring 
incarceration.  
It is certainly true that Congress itself has promoted 
imprisonment for various categories of offenders, such as career 
criminals, violent offenders, and high-level drug traffickers, and, 
over time, has created a host of mandatory minimum sentences 
 151. Letter from Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, to Patrick J. Leahy, 
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Comm., and Charles Grassley, Ranking Member, Senate 
Judiciary Comm. 1–3 (Aug. 7, 2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_ 
Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Submissions/20120807_StC_Prison
_Costs.pdf. 
 152. Id. at 2–3; see also Reevaluating the Effectiveness of Federal Mandatory Minimum 
Sentences: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 1–2, 7 (2013) 
[hereinafter Reevaluating the Effectiveness] (statement of Patti B. Saris, Chair, United 
States Sentencing Commission), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_ 
Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Submissions/20130918_SJC_Mandatory_Mi
nimums.pdf (referring to prison capacity issues but only suggesting Congress provide relief 
for certain mandatory minimums). 
 153. See supra notes 140–143 and accompanying text. 
 154. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 117, at 7–9 (discussing the 
Commission’s desire for uniformity of sentences and factors contributing to unwanted 
sentence disparity). 
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for specific offenses.155 Yet these congressional mandates, by 
definition, affect only subsets of the federal defendant population, 
and they have not necessarily grown in size or as a percentage of 
the federal sentenced population in the last couple of decades. 
The role of mandatory minimums will be addressed first. A 
recent report from the Sentencing Commission announces that 
the percentage of federal cases involving a “mandatory minimum 
penalty has remained relatively constant during the last [twenty] 
years,” accounting for 27% of cases in fiscal years 1991 and 
2010.156 In reality, the role of mandatory minimums in the rate of 
imprisonment is further reduced since the percentage of federal 
defendants who were actually subject to the applicable 
mandatory minimums fell from 21% in 1991 to 14% in the years 
2010–2012.157 The most common reasons that mandatory 
minimums are avoided is that the Guidelines provide relief when 
the defendant is given a substantial assistance departure or 
when the statutory safety valve departure is applied to low-level 
drug offenders.158  
In contrast to ad hoc congressional directives that have led 
to prison sentences for relatively small groups of individuals, the 
Commission policies outlined herein, on the other hand, reach far 
broader, with some of the agency’s prison-by-default policies 
applying across offenses and offenders.159 For example, the 
guideline that limits nonprison punishments to Zones A and B in 
effect are applicable to five out of six defendants.160 
Fans of the escalating rate of incarcerative sentences may 
claim that such a statistic is merely a manifestation of the 
federal population of criminal defendants over time 
representing more heinous offenders. It is true that the rate of 
filing charges for misdemeanors by federal prosecutors has 
fallen from 17% to 12% between fiscal years 1998 and 2011, 
 155. 28 U.S.C. § 994(i)–(j) (2012); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY 
MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM app. A, tbl.A-1 (2011), 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/M
andatory_Minimum_Penalties/20111031_RtC_Mandatory_Minimum.cfm (listing the current 
federal mandatory minimum statutes). 
 156. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 155, at 67. 
 157. Id. The statistics for 2011–2012 were computed using the Commission’s relevant 
datafiles. 
 158. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 155, at 31–36, 158–71 (describing how 
mandatory minimum sentences are avoided and who receives this relief most often). 
 159. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.1 (2013). 
 160. See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text (describing how approximately 83% of 
defendants fall into Zones C and D causing them to not be applicable for probation or fine-only 
sentences). 
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respectively.161 Nonetheless, this is a relatively modest 
differential that cannot count significantly toward explaining 
the dramatic increase in imprisonment. Importantly, other 
evidence is to the contrary, suggesting strongly that the 
federal population of defendants has not experienced increases 
in severity level overall. Data from fiscal years 1998–2012 
show that the mean final offense level (a measurement of 
overall offense/offender severity) has remained fairly constant, 
hovering around eighteen points, with no definitive trend in 
any single direction (ranging from 17.25 to 18.85 on a scale of 
1–43).162 In two recent fiscal years, the mean offense levels 
were on the lower side, being 17.25 in fiscal 2011 and 17.68 in 
fiscal 2012. While the data provide some conflicting 
information, there is no single, clear trend that federal 
defendants have significantly worse criminal histories. The 
mean criminal history score has remained constant during 
that same time as well at II (on a scale of I–VI),163 though the 
percentage of defendants in Criminal History I (the lowest) 
has dropped from 56% in 1996 to 45% in 2012.164 The 
percentage of defendants in the top three criminal history 
categories (IV–VI) did increase from 21% in 1998 to 26% 
during the fiscal years 2004–2010, though it has edged back 
down to less than 23% in 2011 and 2012.165  
If sentence length is also an indication of the severity of the 
offense and of the offender, then average sentence length over time 
also fails to support an ideology of an increasingly more serious 
population of federal defendants. Figure 7 plots the mean length of 
sentences over time with two lines, the lower of the two counting 
probation sentences as zero months and the higher excluding 
probation sentences and focusing on sentences with imprisonment.  
 161. Data compiled from Defendants Charged in Criminal Cases, BUREAU JUST. STAT., 
http://www.bjs.gov/fjsrc/var.cfm?ttype=trends&agency=AOUSC&db_type=CrimCt 
Cases&saf=IN (last visited Apr. 16, 2014) (using the “Felony flag (filing offense)” variable). 
 162. Data compiled from Offenders Sentenced, BUREAU JUST. STAT., 
http://www.bjs.gov/fjsrc/var.cfm?ttype=trends&agency=USSC&db_type=SntcEvnt&saf=O
UT (last visited Apr. 16, 2014) (using variable “Final offense level”); U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, 2012 DATAFILE. 
 163. Data compiled from Offenders Sentenced, BUREAU JUST. STAT., 
http://www.bjs.gov/fjsrc/var.cfm?ttype=trends&agency=USSC&db_type=SntcEvnt&saf=O
UT (last visited Apr. 16, 2014) (using variable “Criminal history category”); U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, 2012 DATAFILE. 
 164. 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, tbl.21; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1996 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 36 tbl.21 (1997). 
 165. Data compiled from Offenders Sentenced, BUREAU JUST. STAT., 
http://www.bjs.gov/fjsrc/var.cfm?ttype=trends&agency=USSC&db_type=SntcEvnt&saf=O
UT (last visited Apr. 16, 2014) (using variable “Criminal history category”); U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, 2012 DATAFILE; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 DATAFILE.  
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Figure 7: Mean Length of Sentence166 
The lines indicate no single trend over the entire time 
period, but they do reflect that mean sentences are lower in 
recent years than in the 1990s, dropping from fifty-one months to 
forty-four months from 1996 and 2012, respectively, when 
including probation sentences, and from sixty-two months to 
fifty-three months for the fiscal years 1996 and 2012, 
respectively, when excluding probation. These numbers suggest 
an overall reduction, though modest, in severity of the 
population, despite Figure 1’s (percentage of prison versus 
probation sentences) consistent trend otherwise. 
The statistical measures of average sentences actually 
issued do not merely reflect the perspective of judges’ collective 
 166. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 42 (2013) [hereinafter 2012 
ANNUAL REPORT]; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 34 (2012) [hereinafter 
2011 ANNUAL REPORT]; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 32 (2011); U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 36 (2010); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2008 
ANNUAL REPORT 34 (2009); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 28 (2008); U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 34 (2007); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2005 
ANNUAL REPORT 38, 45 (2006); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 48, 55 
(2005); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 36 (2004); U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 41 (2003); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 
43 (2002); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 41 (2001); U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 41 (2000); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1998 ANNUAL REPORT 
37 (1999); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 36 (1998); U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 34 (1997). The Commission’s Annual Reports, which are 
referenced throughout this Article, can be found at http://www.ussc.gov/Publications/ 
Annual_Reports_and_Statistical_Sourcebooks/index.cfm. The 1995–2011 Annual Reports 
can be found under the “Archives” link. 
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sense of the culpability of the federal population of defendants. 
While such sentence averages are consistently below the mean 
Guidelines minimum recommended sentences, the two lines are 
relatively parallel, according to Commission reports, meaning 
that the Guidelines’ collective ranking of the sentenced 
population has remained relatively consistent with the judiciary 
over the same time period.167  
Other statistics likewise tend to refute the explanation that 
the increased rate of imprisonment might result from population 
changes, such as with more serious and violent offenders being 
sentenced now rather than in the past. The security level 
classifications of the Bureau of Prisons might be relevant. From 
1998–2010, the percentage of inmates classified to minimum and 
low security statuses combined represent a curvilinear line, thus 
not representing any clear trend.168 Between 55% and 64% of 
federal prisoners (with a mode of 57% in four separate years) 
were assigned to these two lowest security levels. These numbers 
suggest a majority federal prison population of low-level 
offenders, though no definitive conclusion is possible considering 
these measures include nonsentenced immigration detainees, 
District of Columbia inmates, and pretrial defendants.169  
In terms of the potential for more serious and violent 
offenses exhibiting any effect, Figure 8 shows the historical 
trends for federally sentenced defendants by crime type. 
 167. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 117, at 60.  
 168. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, STATE OF THE BUREAU 2010, at 3; FED. BUREAU OF 
PRISONS, STATE OF THE BUREAU 2009, at 57; FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, STATE OF THE 
BUREAU 2008, at 61; FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, STATE OF THE BUREAU 2007, at 52; FED. 
BUREAU OF PRISONS, STATE OF THE BUREAU 2006, at 51; FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, STATE 
OF THE BUREAU 2005, at 51; FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, STATE OF THE BUREAU 2004, at 59; 
FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, STATE OF THE BUREAU 2003, at 57; FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, 
STATE OF THE BUREAU 2002, at 57; FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, STATE OF THE BUREAU 2001, 
at 53; FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, STATE OF THE BUREAU 2000, at 53; FED. BUREAU OF 
PRISONS, STATE OF THE BUREAU 1999, at 53; FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, STATE OF THE 
BUREAU 1998, at 50. The State of the Bureau reports can be found at 
http://www.bop.gov/resources/publications.jsp. 
 169. See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, STATE OF THE BUREAU 1998, at 15–16, 23, 
49–50. 
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Figure 8: Federal Defendants Sentenced by Type of 
Crime170 
As for the potential that the federal defendant population is 
becoming increasingly more violent, the data fail to support such a 
trend. In reality, the number of federal defendants convicted of 
violent offenses has remained a small portion of the sentenced 
population, representing 6% in fiscal 1998 and dropping by half to 
3% in fiscal 2011.171 On the other hand, the percent of weapons 
violations increased from 5% to almost 9%, respectively.172 These 
potential categories representing crimes of violence seem to offset 
each other. But the increase in firearms offenses does not itself 
necessarily indicate weapons are more likely used in violent 
attacks. A separate national study published by the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics shows that the number and rate of violent crimes 
being committed with a firearm has decreased overall from 1993–
2011.173 Taken altogether, the population of federal defendants does 
not appear to represent a more violent group over time. 
 170. Data compiled from Offenders Sentenced, BUREAU JUST. STAT., 
http://www.bjs.gov/fjsrc/var.cfm?ttype=trends&agency=USSC&db_type=SntcEvnt&saf=O
UT (last visited Apr. 16, 2014) (using variable “Offense type”). The Figure excludes 
missing data and cases of unknown type.  
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. MICHAEL PLANTY & JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FIREARM VIOLENCE, 1993–2011, at 1 (2013), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fv9311.pdf (finding firearm-related homicides declined 
39% and nonfatal firearm crimes declined 70% from 1993 to 2011). 
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Drug offenders comprised one-third of federally sentenced 
defendants last year, including those who were not given prison 
terms,174 yet there is evidence that they have become less serious 
offenders. A Commission document recognized in 2004, for example, 
that the “available data suggest a general trend toward less serious 
offenses and a greater incidence of mitigating factors in cases 
sentenced in the late 1990s.”175 The document noted that cases 
involving cocaine tended to be for lesser amounts, defendants were 
more likely to accept responsibility, and defendants were more 
likely to only play a minor role in trafficking.176 Since 2004, there is 
no obvious evidence to support a return to more serious drug 
offending. Indeed, the rates of cocaine and methamphetamine use 
have decreased since 2006 by 50% and 33%, respectively.177 
Further, the federal government’s perspective on drug offending has 
changed dramatically such that drug addiction is now envisioned, 
according to the National Drug Control Strategy 2013, as a disease 
of the brain, and the executive branch supports alternatives to 
incarceration as a general matter.178 In sum, drug offenders are no 
longer considered the odious criminals they once were.  
As shown in Figure 8, the single most significant difference in 
crime type in federal sentencing is the substantial increase in the 
number and percentage of immigration offenders. Strikingly, the 
Commission has at one point contended that the low rate of 
alternative sentences is primarily the result of the increasing 
numbers of noncitizen offenders, which the Commission calls the 
“citizenship effect.”179 Blaming the descent primarily on the 
citizenship effect is questionable. It is true that United States 
citizens are more likely to receive nonincarcerative sentences as 
most of the noncitizens in the federal system are illegal aliens, 
meaning that they are deportable and often ineligible for release.180 
However, the citizenship effect is not nearly as responsible for the 
substantial reliance on prison sentences in recent years as 
suggested. Here, the citizenship effect can be measured in three 
different ways.  
 174. 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, fig.A. 
 175. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 132, at 54. 
 176. Id. 
 177. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 
STRATEGY iii (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov//sites/default/files/ondcp/ 
policy-and-research/ndcs_2013.pdf. 
 178. Id. at 27. 
 179. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 144, at 4. “The decreasing trend in 
alternative sentences . . . is attributable to the non-citizen offenders in the federal 
sentencing population.” Id. at 5–6. 
 180. Id. at 4. 
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Using the clearest definition of the citizenship effect, separate 
statistical analyses of datafiles for each of fiscal years 2010–2012 
show that nonprison sentences overall were issued to 14% to 15% of 
U.S. citizens, as compared to 3% of noncitizens.181 It appears that, 
contrary to the report’s assertion, though, the increasing presence of 
noncitizens itself does not significantly account for the significant 
upward trend of prison sentences as 85% of citizen defendants 
failed to avoid terms of incarceration for those years, a rate far 
higher than before the Guidelines took effect.182 Similarly, in 
comparing the category of immigration offenses with all other 
offenses using the fiscal 2006–2012 data, the results show that 14% 
of nonimmigration offenders received nonprison sentences, 
compared to 4% of immigration offenders.183 Results are consistent 
when isolating illegal entry/reentry cases. Those cases are highly 
likely to receive prison sentences because of the nature of the crime, 
the illegality of such offenders being in the community, and the fact 
that they tend to have higher criminal history scores, averaging a 
criminal history score of III (2.89) while the average is closer to II 
for all other crimes (2.19).184 Statistical analyses of the fiscal 2010–
2012 datasets show that 14% of the rest were sentenced to 
alternative punishments, while less than 2% of illegal entry/reentry 
offenders received nonprison sentences.185 In sum, measuring the 
citizenship effect in three different ways still led to the same 
important result: excluding such potential cases, citizens and 
nonimmigration offenders generally still received prison sentences 
in an overwhelming percentage of cases. 
Supporters of the escalation in the use of imprisonment may 
alternatively (or additionally) assert that the practice largely 
reflects federal prosecutors having become increasingly more 
selective over time in terms of accepting more severe offenses and 
dangerous offenders.186 Again, federal statistics generally fail to 
 181. These analyses utilized the 2010–2012 Commission datafiles. 
 182. See supra Figure 1. 
 183. Data derived from Interactive Sourcebook: Offenders Receiving Sentencing Options in 
Each Primary Offense Category, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, http://isb.ussc.gov/content/pentaho-
cdf/RenderXCDF?solution=Sourcebook&path=&action 
=table_xx.xcdf&template=mantle&table_num=Table12 (last visited Apr. 16, 2014) (selecting 
fiscal 2006–2012 from the “Selection Criteria” menu). 
 184. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2012 DATAFILE (analyses on file with the Author). 
 185. Id.  
 186. See Michael Edmund O’Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: An 
Empirical Analysis of Predictive Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1439, 1475–76, 1477 tbl.21 
(2004) (noting that the only significant reason for prosecutorial declinations to pursue violent 
crimes is jurisdictional or venue problems, while declinations to pursue fraud and property 
crimes occur for numerous reasons, including the availability of other disciplinary 
alternatives). 
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support such a contention. Figure 9 contains data on matters 
prosecuted and those that prosecutors declined to pursue. There 
are three general resolutions to criminal cases: prosecutors send 
them to district courts for prosecution, send them to magistrates 
to pursue (which generally are misdemeanors), or decline them. 
The last two columns represent the number and percentage of 
cases declined by federal prosecutors by year.  
Figure 9: Matters Prosecuted and Declined187 
 
Year Total Matters 
Concluded by 
U.S. Attorneys 
Matters 
Prosecuted in 
U.S. District 
Court 
Matters 
Terminated 
by U.S. 
Magistrate 
Matters  
Declined by 
Prosecutors 
Percent of 
Matters 
Declined 
1994 94,980 50,802 9,754 34,424 36.2% 
1995 102,309 55,703 10,710 35,896 35.1% 
1996 98,454 56,938 8,684 32,832 33.3% 
1997 99,459 60,383 10,007 29,069 29.2% 
1998 106,022 64,993 12,243 28,786 27.2% 
1999 114,283 68,734 14,545 31,004 27.1% 
2000 117,450 73,090 13,916 30,444 25.9% 
2001 118,978 72,648 14,080 32,250 27.1% 
2002 124,081 76,314 14,093 33,674 27.1% 
2003 128,518 80,106 14,810 33,602 26.2% 
2004 148,240 86,485 29,889 31,866 21.5% 
2005 143,640 85,818 28,067 29,755 20.7% 
2006 141,130 83,148 28,305 29,677 21.0% 
2007 144,049 83,791 31,026 29,232 20.3% 
2008 182,723 88,063 66,558 28,102 15.4% 
2009 193,234 91,890 71,564 29,780 15.4% 
2010 193,021 93,493 68,858 30,670 15.9% 
2011 193,534 94,484 68,638 30,412 15.7% 
Notice that, over time, U.S. Attorneys have become far less 
likely to decline cases, whereby 36% of cases were declined in 
1994 and the percentage steadily decreased to a declination rate 
of 16% in 2011. The third and fourth columns, on the other hand, 
indicate that prosecutors are pursuing a steadily increasing 
 187. Data compiled from Suspects in Investigations Concluded, BUREAU JUST. STAT., 
http://www.bjs.gov/fjsrc/var.cfm?ttype=trends&agency=EOUSA&db_type=CrimMatrs&saf
=OUT (last visited Feb. 10, 2014) (using variable “Outcome of the matter”); BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, 1994–1997, at 16 tbl.1.2 (1994–1997). The 1994–1997 Compendiums can be 
found at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbse&sid=4. 
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number (and considering the rate of declination, the percentage 
as well) of cases overall. Thus, there appears to be a negative 
correlation between the total number of matters closed and the 
number of cases declined.  
In other words, Figure 9 indicates that federal prosecutors are 
accepting far more cases and at a higher percentage, signaling they 
have been increasingly less selective in their choices. These trends 
are not explained by crime becoming a greater problem in the 
country, as crime rates nationwide have decreased significantly for 
a wide variety of crime types since the 1990s.188 Other evidence 
providing reasons why federal prosecutors officially decline cases, 
from a national report concerning 2009 decisions, reveals that more 
than half of matters are not pursued because either it was 
determined that no crime was committed or there were evidentiary 
problems.189 This suggests that only a portion of declinations may 
be related to perceptions that referred matters were not significant 
enough for prosecution. 
In sum, this Part has outlined a variety of policies initiated 
and maintained by the Sentencing Commission through 
Sentencing Guidelines that have substantially promoted 
fundamental changes in federal sentencing. More specifically, the 
Commission is largely, perhaps primarily, responsible for a trend 
toward reliance on incarceration in the vast majority of cases. 
Alternative explanations were considered and none of them 
appear to bear greater culpability, judging by relevant statistical 
measures. Nonetheless, regardless of the potential multiple 
sources for the federal sentencing system’s reliance upon 
incarcerative sentences, the significant influence of the 
Commission’s policies, which on their own terms strongly 
promote imprisonment, cannot be doubted. Importantly, the 
Commission’s inflexibility in fully embracing alternatives now 
confronts changed conditions. There is strong evidence that no 
 188. Data derived from Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics: State-by-State and 
National Crime Estimates by Year, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, http://www.bjs.gov/ucrdata/Search/Crime/State/StatebyState.cfm (using “United 
States Total” from 1960 to 2012); see also ERIKA HARRELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION COMMITTED BY STRANGERS, 
1993–2010, at 1 & fig.1 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
vvcs9310.pdf (providing statistics indicating violent victimization by strangers and known 
aggressors substantially declined since 1993); JENNIFER HARDISON WALTERS ET AL., 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOUSEHOLD BURGLARY, 1994–
2011, at 1 & fig.1 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/hb9411.pdf 
(showing that rates of household burglary declined substantially from 1994–2011).  
 189. MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2009—STATISTICAL TABLES 11 tbl.2.3 (2011), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09st.pdf. 
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longer is Congress, or even the general public, willing to fund 
prison expansion or accept mass imprisonment. The next Part 
explains such a conjecture. 
III. POTENTIAL FOR AMELIORATIVE POLICY 
This Article has set forth arguments to support the 
contention that the U.S. Sentencing Commission has 
unfortunately adopted a one-size-fits-all policy in which a prison 
term is the default sentence for federal defendants. As set forth 
in Part II, this position bears the burden of likely being in 
contravention of congressional intent at the time of sentencing 
reforms. Equally important problems are that it contributes to an 
overflowing federal prison system,190 violates the principle of 
parsimonious punishments as prison is unnecessary in many 
cases,191 and taxes the health and welfare of defendants, their 
families, and their communities.192 Times have changed for 
political, philosophical, and economic reasons such that there 
appears to be present a hospitable environment in which 
interested parties can remedy the situation. Professor Frank 
Bowman was prescient in predicting that an unlikely coalition of 
allies could spawn a reformed penology in which the injudicious 
use of imprisonment is not necessarily constructed as a politically 
incorrect, soft-on-crime stance:  
[A] nascent alliance of liberal social action groups concerned 
about over-incarceration of the downtrodden, libertarian 
advocacy groups concerned about the over-criminalization of 
assertedly private behavior, corporate interest groups 
concerned about over-criminalization and over-punishment of 
business activity, political conservatives keen to preserve 
values of federalism against the perceived over-federalization 
of essentially local crime, fiscal conservatives worried about 
the cost of rising prison populations, judges protective of the 
prerogatives of the bench, the defense bar concerned for its 
clients, and perhaps even religious activists moved by the 
biblical imperative that justice be tempered with mercy may 
never coalesce as a unified movement. But concern is rising in 
enough different quarters that a shift in the political 
landscape seems at least possible.193 
 190. See supra notes 147–152 and accompanying text. 
 191. Smith, supra note 18, at 111. 
 192. Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Effective Criminal Sanctions, Report to the House of 
Delegates: On Alternatives to Incarceration and Conviction, 22 FED. SENT’G REP. 62, 67 (2009). 
 193. Frank O. Bowman, III, Mr. Madison Meets a Time Machine: The Political 
Science of Federal Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 235, 264 (2005). 
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Such a shift has occurred—at least in several states, even 
some very conservative states.194 Their successes in sentencing 
reforms, which have generally reduced their prison populations 
while not witnessing either an increased crime rate or public 
backlash, provide a timely model for revolutionizing the federal 
criminal justice system.195 
A. Changed Circumstances 
“Times have changed” is arguably an overused mantra, yet 
nevertheless an expressive phrase that is immanently suitable to 
describe the state of imprisonment in the United States. Many 
states have already embraced a variety of changes to their 
sentencing and correctional policies and, as a result, have 
experienced declining prison populations.196 A dominant theme 
has been to divert cases at the front end from prison to 
noncustodial alternatives, primarily probation.197 The federal 
justice system is lagging behind this revolt.198 Nonetheless, 
corroborating information indicates that federal officials, 
including various members of Congress, may be prepared to 
accept that the reforms of the 1980s are no longer appropriate in 
today’s climate.199 For a variety of reasons, explained below, 
perhaps the time is ripe to reform the reforms in the federal 
sentencing system. 
The first reason is quite simple. Recent Supreme Court 
doctrine clearly sets forth a hospitable legal environment in 
which district courts may explicitly repudiate the Commission’s 
choice to prefer prison sentences in almost all cases. The Booker 
decision is the catalyst here in which the Supreme Court 
rendered the Guidelines voluntary.200 Two watershed Supreme 
Court decisions since Booker provide additional authority for a 
federal district judge to both vary from a Commission policy with 
which she disagrees and to reengage a rehabilitative philosophy. 
 194. Letter from Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Dir., Office of Policy & Legislation, to Patti 
B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 3–5 (July 11, 2013) [hereinafter Wroblewski 
Letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/foia/docs/2013annual-letter-final-
071113.pdf. 
 195. Id. at 5–7. 
 196. Michelle S. Phelps, The Paradox of Probation: Community Supervision in the 
Age of Mass Incarceration, 35 LAW & POL’Y 51, 70–72 (2013). 
 197. Id. at 55. 
 198. See CARSON & GOLINELLI, supra note 37, at 2 & tbl.1, 6 (noting that the federal 
prison population is increasing while the state prison population is declining). 
 199. See infra notes 216–221 and accompanying text (explaining why the current 
prison climate renders the federal system susceptible to reform). 
 200. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
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A policy disagreement is expressly permitted by the Court in the 
case of Kimbrough v. United States, an opinion issued in 2007.201 
The district judge in Kimbrough had rejected the guideline 
applicable to crack cocaine sentencing as he believed it overly 
punitive; the judge therefore varied downward significantly from 
the Guidelines-recommended range.202 The Supreme Court 
affirmed, confirming that Booker meant that the Guidelines were 
now advisory and a district judge who had a policy disagreement 
with a guideline could reject that policy or that guideline.203 The 
Court also noted that the crack cocaine guideline represented a 
Commission-created policy because Congress had not ordered 
it.204 Under this precedent, a district judge may lawfully 
disregard any Commission-initiated, prison-by-default policy or 
guideline.205  
The more recent relevant decision, styled Pepper v. United 
States, finds the Court reconfirming that a district court per 
Booker and Kimbrough has the authority to issue a non-
Guidelines sentence if the judge disagrees with the Commission’s 
views, particularly when such views are not represented by 
Congress’s intent in statutes.206 The Court highlighted, as well, 
Congress’s edict that rehabilitation remains one of the valid 
sentencing goals, such that defendant Pepper’s positive responses 
to correctional programming and supervision were an important 
consideration in determining a parsimonious sentence.207 In sum, 
the Supreme Court case law now provides a sufficient legal 
environment for judges to reject the Commission’s pro-prison 
policies, particularly in light of the policies being contrary to the 
Legislature’s will, and to accept rehabilitation as a proper and 
congressionally accepted objective in deciding on the type and 
length of punishment appropriate in the case. 
The second reason is equally quite simple: economics. The 
recent recession has taken a toll on government coffers, and 
there is no doubt that prisons are an extremely costly 
endeavor.208 During the law-and-order movement of the 1980s 
 201. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007). 
 202. Id. at 92–93. 
 203. Id. at 108–11. 
 204. Id. at 102–03. 
 205. Id. at 91; see Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 665, 
667–78 (2006) (describing how after Booker a judge can “thumb his nose” at the federal 
Sentencing Guidelines). 
 206. Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1237, 1248–50 (2011). 
 207. Id. at 1242. 
 208. ALISON LAWRENCE & DONNA LYONS, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, PRINCIPLES OF EFFECTIVE STATE SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS POLICY 
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and 1990s, public officials seemed willing and financially able to 
keep up with rising inmate populations simply by building new 
prisons or outsourcing to private prison contractors, generally 
with the approval of their constituents.209 An interested observer 
explains the transformation in easy terms: 
[T]he increasing rates of admission coupled with a jump in 
the amount of time served resulting from increasingly 
restrictive release policies made this approach untenable as 
a long-term strategy, and by the late 1990s, states were 
beginning to succumb to prison overcrowding and were 
unable to continue to access the funds necessary to expand 
capacity.210  
Instead, “[p]ropelled by state budget crises and a shift in the 
politics of punishment, these declines in incarceration are the 
result of a flurry of reform efforts, including revised criminal 
codes and sentencing guidelines, expanded prison alternative 
programs, and improved community supervision policies.”211 
Even the National Conference on State Legislatures now 
suggests offering a continuum of community supervision options, 
which would benefit the public by extending corrections 
resources further.212 
Largely as a result of these state reforms, the overall 
national prison population of sentenced defendants declined for 
the third consecutive year in 2012.213 Nine states, some of which 
bend politically conservative, were primarily responsible, each 
posting a decrease of over 1,000 prisoners in 2012: California, 
Texas, North Carolina, Colorado, Arkansas, New York, Florida, 
Virginia, and Maryland.214 But while the state prison population 
collectively declined by almost 30,000 prisoners in 2012 (down 
2.1%), the federal prison headed in the opposite direction, 
increasing by about 1,500 prisoners in 2012.215 The remainder of 
the reasons explains further why the current climate renders the 
federal system finally susceptible to a similar transformation and 
how economic concerns are relevant. 
11 (2011), available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/pew/WGprinciplesreport.pdf; 
King, supra note 21, at 48. 
 209. King, supra note 21, at 48. 
 210. Id. (“As long as there was public support for ‘tough on crime’ policies and the 
commensurate tax revenues and bond issuance, states and the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
were able to keep green-lighting prison construction.”). 
 211. Phelps, supra note 196, at 52. 
 212. LAWRENCE & LYONS, supra note 208, at 11. 
 213. CARSON & GOLINELLI, supra note 37, at 1, 4. 
 214. Id. at 1–2. 
 215. Id. at 1 (including all prisoners in custody). 
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Third, the politics of punishment at the federal level has just 
recently been recalibrated. A startling coalition of politicians and 
policy foundations has just emerged calling for prison reductions, 
including Republican (and former presidential candidate) Newt 
Gingrich, religious conservative Pat Nolan of the Prison Fellowship, 
conservative Texas Public Policy Foundation, religious conservative 
Family Research Council, and liberal American Civil Liberties 
Union.216 Republican Senator Rand Paul and Democratic Senator 
Patrick Leahy have cosponsored a bill in the Senate, called the 
Smarter Sentencing Act of 2013, which would provide an additional 
safety-valve departure to avoid mandatory minimums for many 
drug offenders.217 While the focus of the legislation is limited, the 
purpose is broader. The senators have expressed that their larger 
joint concerns address overincarceration and the unacceptably high 
costs associated with the federal prison system.218 A Washington, 
D.C. reporter observes that it appears that “agreement cuts across 
party lines that our decades-long experiment in mass incarceration 
has been a huge policy failure.”219 Interestingly, at a committee 
hearing on the 2013 safety-valve bill, Rand Paul expressed his 
support for returning to the judiciary substantial power in 
sentencing, noting each case should be judged on its own merits in 
terms of the appropriate punishment.220 
With a variety of politically savvy leaders appearing to be in 
agreement on reducing prison costs, it is even more evident that 
some significant policy change to reduce the federal inmate 
population is imminently necessary. The Government 
Accountability Office projects that, with the current state of 
affairs, the Federal Bureau of Prisons will witness another 15% 
increase in the inmate population by 2020.221  
 216. Dagan & Teles, supra note 12, at 25–30 (“Change is coming to criminal justice 
because evangelicals and libertarians have discovered that the nation’s prison growth is 
morally objectionable by their own, conservative standards.”). 
 217. Prison Reform: An Unlikely Alliance of Left and Right, supra note 35, at 23.  
 218. Reevaluating the Effectiveness, supra note 152, at 1–2 (statement of Sen. Patrick 
Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“Today we meet to confront the 
unsustainable growth of our federal prison population. After years of debate, I am 
encouraged that we have bipartisan agreement that we must act; that we must reevaluate 
how many people we send to prison and for how long. Fiscal responsibility demands it. 
Justice demands it.”). 
 219. Greg Sargent, Where Are Republicans on Sentencing Reform?, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 11, 2013, 2:57 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/09/11/ 
where-are-republicans-on-sentencing-reform/. 
 220. Prison Reform: An Unlikely Alliance of Left and Right, supra note 35, at 24; see 
also Reevaluating the Effectiveness, supra note 152, at 1 (statement of Sen. Rand Paul). 
 221. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BUREAU OF PRISONS: GROWING INMATE 
CROWDING NEGATIVELY AFFECTS INMATES, STAFF, AND INFRASTRUCTURE 12 (2012), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648123.pdf.  
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Fourth, popular sentiment about criminal justice policy has 
likewise shifted in the last decade. When fear of crime is high, it 
seems understandable that a public who believes in the 
deterrence value of imprisonment would support prison 
sentences, even lengthy ones. Yet, crime is no longer one of the 
country’s most immediate social problems.222 One likely 
explanation is that rates of both violent and property crime, 
though witnessing an increase in the late 1980s, have since 
noticeably declined, as shown in Figures 10 and 11, respectively. 
Figure 10: National Violent Crime Rates223 
Figure 11: National Property Crime Rates224 
 222. Adelman, supra note 1, at 295–96. 
 223. Data derived from Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics: State-by-State and 
National Crime Estimates by Year, supra note 188 (choosing “United States-Total,” 
“Violent crime rates,” and the years 1982–2012). 
 224. Id. (choosing “United States-Total,” “Property crime rates,” and the years 1982–
2012). 
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Lower crime rates naturally “reduce[] public fear and 
alleviate[] political pressure to adopt ‘tough on crime’ 
measures.”225 The public, except perhaps in a few urban cities 
such as certain Chicago and Detroit neighborhoods, is no longer 
as preoccupied with fear of gangs and drug-related street 
violence as it was in the 1980s.226 In lieu thereof, in terms of fear 
of violent victimization, the public’s more pressing concerns 
appear to be threat of terroristic attacks and mass shootings, 
which uniquely are unlikely to be deterred by the threat of 
imprisonment.227 Other issues that are consuming Americans’ 
attention concern struggling with the recession, such as blows 
that the housing and job markets have taken.228 The public, 
therefore, has embraced a different perspective on criminal 
punishment: “Americans believe too many people are in prison 
and the nation spends too much keeping them there.”229 The 
American Bar Association’s position is representative: “In the 
past ten years there have been increasing doubts about the 
efficacy of increased incarceration as a general crime control 
measure, at least when unaccompanied by serious efforts to treat 
substance abuse and mental illness in the prison population.”230  
Fifth, a related cultural shift has occurred with respect to 
perspectives on the drug war. The federal government has been 
at the forefront of convicting and imprisoning drug offenders. As 
depicted in Figure 12, half of the current federal prison 
population has been convicted of drug-related charges. However, 
many now view the drug war as a colossal failure, and the public 
is no longer on board.231 In support thereof, when Congress 
recently passed a law to substantially decrease penalties for 
 225. David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
27, 35 (2011). 
 226. Id.; Lehrer, supra note 7, at 23–24.  
 227. Cole, supra note 225, at 38; Laura Dugan, To Deter Terrorism, Think Beyond 
Punishment, BALTIMORE SUN (May 2, 2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-05-
02/news/bs-ed-deterring-terrorists-20130502_1_terrorists-punishment-martha-crenshaw 
(“The historical record shows that terrorists are often willing to die for their cause, 
making threats of punishment seem inconsequential.”). 
 228. CBS News Poll Database, ROPER CENTER (Jan. 2014), http://www.ropercenter. 
uconn.edu/psearch/question_view.cfm?qid=1845286&pid=1&ccid=1 (polling respondents with 
the question “What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?”). 
 229. Alison Lawrence, States Are Consolidating and Closing Prisons as Reforms and 
Budget Cuts Decrease Inmate Populations, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2013), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/shrinking-prisons.aspx. 
 230. Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Effective Criminal Sanctions, supra note 192, at 63. 
 231. Eduardo Porter, Numbers Tell of Failure in Drug War, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2012, 
at B1. 
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crack cocaine trafficking, there was bipartisan support for it and 
little public backlash.232  
 
Figure 12: Federally Sentenced Prison Population by 
Crime Type, 2011233 
In combination, several of the foregoing reasons for 
changed circumstances suggest potentially an exponential 
impact on political will to reduce the federal prison population. 
The federal government’s budget crises in recent years, the 
public’s focus on issues other than ordinary crime control, 
reductions in crime rates, and the variety of political 
persuasions to jump on the bandwagon to reduce mass 
sentencing at the federal level all suggest that the time may be 
overdue for Congress to decline funding new prisons without 
risking being labeled as soft on crime or suffering other 
political consequences.234 Still, several additional 
developments have transpired to justify the timeliness of re-
embracing alternative sentencing. 
 232. Gary Fields, House Passes Bill to Ease Crack-Cocaine Sentences, WALL ST. J., 
July 29, 2010, at A4; see also Editorial, Fairer Sentences for Crack, WASH. POST, July 21, 
2010, at A18 (describing the various public interest groups that supported the bill). 
 233. Prisoners in Federal Prison at Year-End, BUREAU JUST. STAT., 
http://www.bjs.gov/fjsrc/var.cfm?ttype=one_variable&agency=BOP&db_type=Prisoners&s
af=STK (last visited Apr. 16, 2014) (using year 2011 and variable “Offense type” and 
displaying “All values”). The graph excludes cases of unknown or miscellaneous type. 
 234. See generally Lehrer, supra note 7 (explaining how support for prison reductions 
is consistent with a conservative agenda for these reasons). 
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The sixth reason is that the need to revolutionize federal 
sentencing policies was recently endorsed by a key player. As 
Professor Bowman suggested almost a decade ago, serious change 
to the current sentencing system would require a catalyst of either 
the Justice Department or Congress being convinced that such 
change was required.235 The Department of Justice is evidently now 
so convinced. In a document publicly released in the summer of 
2013, the Department of Justice took what is certainly a 
trailblazing position in modern times, considering the executive 
agency’s typically tough-on-criminals approach, by declaring that “it 
is time to rethink the nation’s system of mass imprisonment.”236 To 
be even clearer about the desire for significant change, in another 
public document this same year, a leading official proclaimed the 
Department of Justice’s intent to reform federal sentencing policy in 
the near term to reduce reliance on imprisonment.237 The 
Department of Justice’s concerns address inefficient use of 
resources, prison overpopulation, and more general issues of 
fairness.238 Attorney General Eric Holder noted around the same 
time in a speech addressing the American Bar Association that the 
growth in the federal prison population has far outpaced the growth 
in the national population and expressed his belief that federal 
prisons were unnecessarily overpopulated.239 He stated that  
the promise of equal justice for all . . . . must lead us all to 
acknowledge that—although incarceration has a significant 
role to play in our justice system—widespread incarceration 
at the federal, state, and local levels is both ineffective and 
unsustainable. It imposes a significant economic burden—
totaling $80 billion in 2010 alone—and it comes with 
human and moral costs that are impossible to calculate.240  
Consistent with the theme of this Article, the Justice 
Department is now calling for restraint in the inclination to resort 
to imprisonment in the first instance, while promoting the use of 
alternative sanctions in the federal system.241 Attorney General 
Holder laments that “[a]s a nation, we are coldly efficient in our 
 235. Bowman, supra note 193, at 259. 
 236. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SMART ON CRIME: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 1 (2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/smart-on-
crime.pdf. 
 237. Wroblewski Letter, supra note 194, at 1, 3. 
 238. Id. at 7–8. 
 239. Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar 
Association’s House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013) (transcript available at 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech-130812.html). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
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incarceration efforts.”242 Further, “with an outsized, unnecessarily 
large prison population, we need to ensure that incarceration is 
used to punish, deter, and rehabilitate—not merely to warehouse 
and forget.”243  
The Department of Justice similarly issued a policy document 
on behalf of the agency, titled Smart on Crime, calling for reform, in 
which it affirmatively asserted that “[i]ncarceration is not the 
answer in every criminal case;” instead, “[i]n appropriate instances 
involving non-violent offenses, prosecutors ought to consider 
alternatives to incarceration, such as drug courts, specialty courts, 
or other diversion programs” and that this “requires a top-to-bottom 
look at our system of incarceration. For many non-violent, low-level 
offenses, prison may not be the most sensible method of 
punishment.”244 The Department of Justice’s ex-officio member of 
the Sentencing Commission likewise reiterated that “imprisonment 
is a power that should be exercised sparingly and only as 
necessary.”245 On this issue, the Department of Justice has 
definitively made a precedent-setting stance in clearly rejecting 
prison as the default sentence. 
Seventh, successes from state reforms can serve as 
appropriate models. Significantly, the Department of Justice 
agrees. Returning to Eric Holder’s public statements:  
We have studied state systems and been impressed by the 
policy shifts some have made. . . . In recent years, no fewer 
than [seventeen] states—supported by the [Justice] 
Department, and led by governors and legislators of both 
parties—have directed funding away from prison construction 
and toward evidence-based programs and services, like 
treatment and supervision, that are designed to reduce 
recidivism.246  
The Department of Justice’s Smart on Crime document concurs 
that federal law enforcement should adopt the states’ approach,247 
particularly considering crime rates generally failed to rise 
afterward:   
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 236, at 3–4. 
 245. Wroblewski Letter, supra note 194, at 3. 
 246. Holder, supra note 239. 
 247. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 236, at 4. “[The Department of Justice’s] 
findings align with a growing movement at the state level to scrutinize the cost-
effectiveness of our corrections system. In recent years, states such as Texas and 
Arkansas have reduced their prison populations by pioneering approaches that seek 
alternatives to incarceration for people convicted of low-level, nonviolent drug offenses.” 
Id. at 1. 
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Many states have lowered their incarceration rates and still 
experienced a drop in crime. Between 1998 and 2007, states 
that had the greatest increases in incarceration rates did 
not necessarily see a corresponding drop in crime rates. In 
some states, the opposite was true: they reduced their 
incarceration rates and their crime rates fell.248 
Eighth, probationary sentences have continued to be a 
mainstay in the American system of criminal justice. It is the 
federal sentencing system that is the outlier. The most common 
type of sentence in the states today (combining felonies and 
misdemeanors) is probation, which has been depicted as the states’ 
default sentence.249 As a commentator reflected: “The American 
criminal justice system has an apparent addiction to the use of 
probation as a means for adjudicating vast numbers of cases, 
particularly misdemeanors.”250 Figure 1 earlier provided rates of 
prison versus alternative sentences for federal offenders and 
indicated the most recent alternative sentence rate was 10% 
(combining felonies and misdemeanors). The steep decline in the 
rate of federal nonprison sentences (the vast majority of which were 
probation) since 1988 is in stark contrast to the situation in states’ 
sentencing patterns. States are far more likely than the federal 
system to sentence even felons to probation, and, unlike the 
downward spiral for federal defendants, the rate in the states has 
remained consistent. From 1990 to 2006 (the latest year for which 
the combined statistic is available), the rate of probationary 
punishments for felonies (here, excluding misdemeanors) in the 
states varied slightly, ranging from 27% to 32%.251  
 248. JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 6, at 2 (footnote omitted) (citing JUSTICE 
POLICY INST., FACTSHEET: PERCENT CHANGE IN INCARCERATION AND CRIME RATES, 1998–
2007 (2008), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/07-02_FAC_Stateby 
StateIncarceration_AC-PS.pdf). Importantly, the reference to both incarceration rate and 
crime rate is not meant to suggest any causal connection between the two. Far too many 
factors are at play in explaining changes in crime rates. Id. (showing that there is little 
correlation between states’ incarceration rates and crime rates). Instead, the implication 
is that the policies that reduced reliance on imprisonment likely have not faced political 
backlash as crime rates kept dropping. Id. at 1–2. 
 249. See Horwitz, supra note 20, at 753–54, 759–60. 
 250. Id. at 753. 
 251. These statistics were extracted from the following documents: SEAN 
ROSENMERKEL, MATTHEW DUROSE & DONALD FAROLE, JR., BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006—
STATISTICAL TABLES 4 tbl.1.2 (2009), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
fssc06st.pdf (27%); MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2004, at 3 
(2007), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc04.pdf (28%); MATTHEW R. 
DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS, 2002—STATISTICAL TABLES tbl.1.2 
(2005), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sc0201st.pdf (31%); MATTHEW R. 
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Financial considerations play an important role in justifying 
limiting prison sentences and promoting alternatives. Annual costs 
of imprisonment per inmate in the federal system range from 
$21,000 up to $34,000, depending on the prison security level, which 
averages about eight times the annual costs of supervision by 
probation officers in the community.252 As a result of the high cost 
of imprisonment, the federal prison system now accounts for over a 
quarter of the Department of Justice’s budget, and if current trends 
continue, it will only consume a larger portion in the future.253 As a 
policy think tank warns, this will have the unfortunate consequence 
of funneling money to prisons instead of funding federal 
investigators and prosecutors or supporting state and local 
governments.254 
Ninth, probation is not deemed by many as the lenient and 
primarily rehabilitative sentence that the Sentencing Commission 
believes it to be. “No longer does the decision to grant probation 
mean, as one commentator observed in 1969, ‘the difference 
between almost total freedom in the community and almost total 
control in the typical maximum security prison.’”255 Further, 
[n]o longer is probation synonymous with the “soft” 
enterprise of rehabilitating offenders. Rather, in tandem 
with the expanded array of techniques coming into use over 
time, which by design and effect have considerably more 
onerous effects, probation today is animated by a far richer 
gamut of purposes—including the punishment, deterrence 
and incapacitation of offenders, and the restoration of 
victims and communities to their pre-crime status.256  
DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2000, at 10 (2003), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc00.pdf (32%); JODI M. BROWN, PATRICK A. LANGAN 
& DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY 
SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 1996, at 2 tbl.2 (1999), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc96.pdf (31%); PATRICK A. LANGAN & JODI M. 
BROWN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN 
STATE COURTS, 1994, at 2 tbl.2 (1997), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
fssc94.pdf (29%); PATRICK A. LANGAN & JOHN M. DAWSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 1990, at 2 tbl.2 
(1993), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc90.pdf (29%). 
 252. LA VIGNE & SAMUELS, supra note 17, at 2; Supervision Costs Significantly Less 
than Incarceration in Federal System, THIRD BRANCH NEWS (July 18, 2013), 
http://news.uscourts.gov/supervision-costs-significantly-less-incarceration-federal-system. 
 253. LA VIGNE & SAMUELS, supra note 17, at 2. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Wayne A. Logan, The Importance of Purpose in Probation Decision Making, 7 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 171, 194 (2003) (quoting ROBERT O. DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE 
DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH, AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE 71 (1969)). 
 256. Id. at 172. 
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Community supervision can be quite punitive. Studies have 
shown that intensive probation conditions may be dreaded more 
than a prison stay considering the requirement of complying with 
a combination of multiple conditions.257 Some offenders actually 
choose to serve a prison term in lieu of intensive probation after 
factoring in the constant pressures of compliance.258 In other 
cases, a prison sentence is unnecessary to ensure the defendant 
feels sufficient pain: “For many minor and first-time offenders, 
no sanction other than conviction itself may be needed to punish 
and deter: the shame and stigma of conviction will be 
adequate.”259 These studies support Congress’s assumptions, as 
represented in the Senate and House Committee Reports 
accompanying the Reform Act mentioned earlier, that probation 
and other alternatives to prison could exemplify sufficiently 
punitive sentences.260 
Tenth, experts highlight the damage that mass incarceration 
inflicts on families and communities.261 The Justice Department’s 
ex-officio member of the Sentencing Commission formally 
recognized that the mass incarceration policy has taken “a great 
human and fiscal toll.”262 Attorney General Holder likewise 
exclaimed: “Today, a vicious cycle of poverty, criminality, and 
incarceration traps too many Americans and weakens too many 
communities. And many aspects of our criminal justice system 
may actually exacerbate these problems, rather than alleviate 
them.”263 An expert on sentencing policy agrees: 
[W]e are beginning to recognize that our overreliance on 
locking people up has an especially malign effect on poor 
urban neighborhoods, where up to [twenty] percent of the 
adult male population may be behind bars at any given 
 257. Joan Petersilia & Elizabeth Piper Deschenes, What Punishes? Inmates Rank the 
Severity of Prison vs. Intermediate Sanctions, FED. PROBATION, Mar. 1994, at 3, 6–7; 
Kimora, The Emerging Paradigm in Probation and Parole in the United States, 46 J. 
OFFENDER REHABILITATION, no. 3/4, 2008, at 1, 3. 
 258. Kimora, supra note 257, at 1, 3. 
 259. Cecelia Klingele, Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 103 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1015, 1056 (2013). 
 260. See supra notes 72–79 and accompanying text. 
 261. Ann Jacobs & Sarah From, Foreword to JUDITH GREENE, KEVIN PRANIS & NATASHA 
A. FROST, THE PUNITIVENESS REPORT—HARD HIT: THE GROWTH IN THE IMPRISONMENT OF 
WOMEN, 1977–2004, at 7, 8 (2006), available at http://66.29.139.159/institute/hardhit/ 
HardHitReport4.pdf (“The cycling of women through the criminal justice system has a 
destabilizing effect not only on the women's immediate families, but on the social 
networks of their communities. They are, more often than not, primary caretakers of 
young children and other family members.”). 
 262. Wroblewski Letter, supra note 194, at 2. 
 263. Holder, supra note 239. 
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time. Not only do the men come home with diminished 
prospects that hurt the whole community, but . . . their 
absence weakens the family and social networks they need 
when they come home and hurts those left behind. It is no 
accident that the sons and brothers of men who go to prison 
are more likely to follow the same path. These trends help 
cause crime rather than prevent it.264 
In advocating for reductions in the rate of incarceration, the 
American Bar Association likewise decries the extreme, negative 
impact on children and families of sparing use of community 
supervision.265 
There is another important sense in which “communities” 
suffer from overincarceration. The Government Accountability 
Office recently warned that overcrowding in federal prisons 
imposed substantial negative consequences to the safety and 
security of inmates as well as staff.266 
Finally, policy analysts and social scientists concur that 
there is important evidence that alternatives may often be 
preferable to protect communities and promote positive 
rehabilitative outcomes. Studies show that imprisonment does 
not protect public safety to the extent expected267 and may 
actually endanger future communities because of the 
criminogenic effects of prison.268 Another study found that 
defendants “sentenced to prison failed more often and more 
quickly than offenders placed on probation and that incarcerated 
drug offenders had significantly higher recidivism rates than any 
 264. Joan Petersilia, Beyond the Prison Bubble, FED. PROBATION, June 2011, at 2, 3; 
see also Adelman, supra note 1, at 310 (“[M]ass incarceration divides minority 
communities as the experience of pervasive imprisonment is confined to those who do not 
have a college education. Mass incarceration also disrupts inner city neighborhoods and 
tears apart families living there.” (footnote omitted)). 
 265. Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Effective Criminal Sanctions, supra note 192, at 67. 
 266. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 221, at 18. 
 267. Daniel S. Nagin, Francis T. Cullen & Cheryl Lero Jonson, Imprisonment and 
Reoffending, 38 CRIME & JUST. 115, 115, 119–21 (2009) (reviewing empirical studies and 
concluding that “incarceration appears to have a null or mildly criminogenic effect on 
future criminal behavior”). 
 268. See Francis T. Cullen, Cheryl Lero Jonson & Daniel S. Nagin, Prisons Do Not 
Reduce Recidivism: The High Cost of Ignoring Science, 91 PRISON J. 48S, 48S, 59S–60S 
(2011) (reviewing studies and concluding that “the use of custodial sanctions may have 
the unanticipated consequence of making society less safe”); Robert DeFina & Lance 
Hannon, For Incapacitation, There Is No Time Like the Present: The Lagged Effects of 
Prisoner Reentry on Property and Violent Crime Rates, 39 SOC. SCI. RES. 1004, 1013 
(2010) (“[A]ny crime-reducing benefits of increased incarceration are completely wiped out 
by the crime-promoting effects associated with the increasing prevalence of ex-inmates.”); 
Daniel P. Mears, Joshua C. Cochran & William D. Bales, Gender Differences in the Effects 
of Prison on Recidivism, 40 J. CRIM. JUST. 370, 375 (2012) (finding prison had a modest 
criminogenic effect). 
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other offenders.”269 Other experts acknowledge the likely 
diminishing returns of the increased rate of imprisonment and 
reductions in crime.270 As for prison capacity issues, experts 
agree that front-end changes, including diverting sentences from 
incarceration to probation, represent a best practice to alleviate 
prison overcrowding.271  
B. Potential Guidelines Policy Changes 
Congress could certainly act by passing legislation to reverse 
the Commission’s policies favoring prison in all cases. Arguably, 
though, it does not need to, considering that it already had 
approved the widespread use, perhaps even a preference for, 
alternatives to prison, as discussed previously.272 In addition, the 
fact that the Department of Justice is evidently a proponent of 
substantially reducing the federal incarceration rate means that 
the other two criminal justice institutions—being the 
Commission and the federal judiciary—are the players that now 
must confront dramatically changed circumstances and alter 
their perspectives and practices. The Commission is the more 
obvious of the two with which to begin, considering the argument 
herein that the downward rate of alternative sentences is due 
largely to Commission-directed policies.273 
Importantly, the Department of Justice, in its recent call for 
further reforms, specifically appealed to the Sentencing 
Commission to effect changes in the Guidelines with the goal of 
controlling the prison population.274 The executive agency has 
specifically invited the Commission to learn from the states’ 
successes and failures to “address the significant challenges 
facing the federal criminal justice system today.”275  
A federal district judge is concerned: “It might seem odd that 
the Commission was more concerned about judges imposing 
 269. Cassia Spohn & David Holleran, The Effect of Imprisonment on Recidivism 
Rates of Felony Offenders: A Focus on Drug Offenders, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 329, 352 (2002). 
 270. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 51–52 (2007); 
Anne Morrison Piehl & Bert Useem, Prisons, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 532, 542 
(James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2011). 
 271. See e.g., NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42937, THE FEDERAL PRISON 
POPULATION BUILDUP: OVERVIEW, POLICY CHANGES, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS 2 (2013); LA 
VIGNE & SAMUELS, supra note 17, at 6. 
 272. See supra Part II.B (detailing the history of the Sentencing Reform Act and 
Congress’s original intention of promoting alternatives to prison sentences).  
 273. See supra notes 155–165 and accompanying text (explaining how the Sentencing 
Commission’s policy seems to favor prison over alternative sentences). 
 274. Wroblewski Letter, supra note 194, at 1–3. 
 275. Id. at 1. 
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insufficiently harsh sentences than it was about mass 
incarceration.”276 Recommendations for Guidelines policy 
changes to reverse this perspective are obvious. These include 
substantially reducing sentencing ranges, perhaps across the 
board, and providing more research-based departures for 
offenders who pose less risk than the current Guidelines 
appreciate.277 And to comport with the theme of this Article, 
suggestions would be to prioritize complying with prior 
congressional mandates concerning alternative sentences. 
The Commission should jettison its prison-by-default 
ideology and start anew with the philosophy that giving direction 
on the full range of types of sentences is at least as important as 
guidance on the length of imprisonment. Writing full guidelines 
on the continuum of nonprison sentences can take the Guidelines 
to a much higher level, improve the relevance of the Commission, 
and provide needed direction to district judges. The Commission 
has both the general expertise to do so and the current 
information on various alternatives and their relative successes 
at the state level, according to a symposium on alternatives the 
agency hosted in 2008.278 In addition, the prison and fiscal crises 
call for a well-constructed and research-based in/out guideline. 
Professor Wayne Logan has recognized that the in/out 
determination is far more nuanced than a decision on the length 
of a prison sentence, but one that can be appropriately guided by 
thoughtful criteria.279 Thus, outlining factors a judge should 
consider in deciding whether prison is necessary would be 
helpful.280 Finally, the single prison grid is generally of no use to 
 276. Adelman, supra note 1, at 298. 
 277. Reevaluating the Effectiveness, supra note 152, at 2, 7, 10–11 (statement of Patti 
B. Saris, Chair, United States Sentencing Commission) (recommending that “safety 
valves” be expanded and applied more broadly to allow for a reduction in the sentence of 
non-violent offenders). 
 278. See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PROCEEDINGS FROM THE SYMPOSIUM 
ON ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION 209, 212, 216–17, 220–22 (2008) (statements of 
Susan Katzenelson, Executive Director, North Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory 
Commission; Mark Bergstrom, Executive Director, Pennsylvania Commission on 
Sentencing; David Guntharp, Director, Arkansas Department of Community Corrections; 
and Rick Kern, Director, Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Research_Projects/Alternatives/20080714_A
lternatives/11_FINAL_StatesImplementation.pdf (describing the various alternative 
sentences used and results experienced by North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Arkansas, and 
Virginia). 
 279. Logan, supra note 255, at 181–83, 194–95. 
 280. A well-respected jurist, Judge Richard A. Posner, argues that federal judges 
have failed to converge on sentencing, in large part because the Commission has not 
formulated and educated judges on a “coherent, evidence-based theory of criminal 
punishment.” RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 314 (2013).  
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alternative sentences, meaning that producing separate tables 
for them is an appropriate task.  
In the end, it appears to be preferable to adopt the states’ 
sentencing philosophy in that the in/out decision ought to favor 
nonprison sentences. Prison should be considered a scarce 
resource, such that it is reserved for when there is a reason in 
the individual case that strongly indicates that a prison sentence 
is necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing other than 
rehabilitation. The fact that drug offenders represent about half 
of sentenced prisoners in recent years281 bolsters this proposition 
considering the nation’s experience in which rehabilitative 
programming generally provides better opportunities for 
successful outcomes than lengthy prison terms.282 
Despite these basic suggestions being consistent with the 
mission given the Commission, determining whether the agency 
will actually do so is merely guesswork at this point. On the 
positive side, the Commission has in the past studied alternative 
sentences, showing its willingness and ability to do so. At an 
early stage, a working group was established specifically for that 
purpose. Chaired by Norman Carlson, who had been the director 
of the Federal Bureau of Prisons from 1970 through 1987, the 
Alternatives to Imprisonment Project produced a lengthy paper 
that detailed “a package of highly structured sentencing options 
emphasizing accountability, control, responsibility, counseling, 
education and other treatment or risk reducing programs” which 
addressed all four sentencing philosophies, including 
rehabilitation.283 While the working group still suggested that some 
term of imprisonment be imposed in almost all cases, it set forth a 
continuum of community sanctions that could be used in lieu of a 
portion of a prison term.284 The report stated that alternatives could 
save tax dollars, provide efficiency in using prison space, and 
increase fairness.285 The report even suggested specific exchange 
rates between the type of alternative and prison time (such as 
one day of intensive probation supervision being equivalent to 
 281. See supra Figure 12. 
 282. DOUG MCVAY, VINCENT SCHIRALDI & JASON ZIEDENBERG, JUSTICE POLICY INST., 
TREATMENT OR INCARCERATION?: NATIONAL AND STATE FINDINGS ON THE EFFICACY AND 
COST SAVINGS OF DRUG TREATMENT VERSUS IMPRISONMENT 5–6, 9–10 (2004), available at 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/04-01_rep_mdtreatmentor 
incarceration_ac-dp.pdf. 
 283. ALTERNATIVES TO IMPRISONMENT PROJECT, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, THE 
FEDERAL OFFENDER: A PROGRAM OF INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS introductory note, 51 
(1990), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/151251NCJRS.pdf. 
 284. Id. at 53–65, 73. 
 285. Id. at 5–9. 
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three days of prison).286 Unfortunately, these recommendations 
have been generally neglected by the agency as a whole.287  
Later, as evidenced in a 1996 report, Commission staff 
recognized that alternatives were rarely imposed despite the fact 
there was no evidence that alternative programming was not 
readily available.288 In that same report, staffers suggested the 
Commission draft an in/out guideline and prepare grids for 
alternative sentences.289 These goals have yet to be achieved. 
Over a decade thereafter, the Commission tried again. In 2008 
the Commission held a two-day national symposium on alternatives 
to incarceration, gathering together a host of state and federal 
experts and practitioners, with the intent to “gather information 
regarding the use of alternatives to incarceration and to provide a 
forum for idea-sharing concerning implementation of 
nonincarceration sanctions in the federal system.”290 On a positive 
front, the Commission in a report post-symposium seemed to 
embrace the practical advantages of alternatives: 
Effective alternative sanctions are important options for 
federal, state, and local criminal justice systems. For the 
appropriate offenders, alternatives to incarceration can 
provide a substitute for costly incarceration. Ideally, 
alternatives also provide those offenders opportunities by 
diverting them from prison (or reducing time spent in 
prison) and into programs providing the life skills and 
treatment necessary to become law-abiding and productive 
members of society.291  
Nonetheless, the symposium produced little change. Perhaps 
this was due, in part, to the Department of Justice’s 
representative at the symposium rejecting any need to change 
the Guidelines with respect to alternative sentencing.292 
Obviously, this statement preceded the recent change of heart by 
the agency’s top brass.293 In any event, the Commission took two 
 286. Id. at 63. 
 287. Hoelter, supra note 99, at 54. The Commission rejected the various exchange 
rates, simply incorporating a day-for-day equivalent between imprisonment and home 
detention or community confinement. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.1(e) 
(2013). 
 288. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 145, at 15.  
 289. Id. at 24–25. 
 290. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 278, at 2. 
 291. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 144, at 20. 
 292. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 278, at 389 (statement of Linda Hoffa, 
Criminal Division Chief, United States Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania). 
 293. See supra notes 236–245 and accompanying text. 
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subsequent actions. First, the Commission issued a report in 
2009 on alternative sentences. This report concedes that 
Congress considered probation to be an actual sentencing option 
and that community confinement options can be cost effective.294  
The second consequence of the 2008 symposium on alternatives 
was a Guidelines amendment. The Commission passed the 
amendment, effective in late 2010, that it described as “expanding 
the availability of alternatives to incarceration”; yet the most 
significant change it accomplished was to move Zones B and C one 
cell higher on the criminal history score axis.295 These changes 
affect only a small proportion of offenders.296 Other than the minor 
changes made in the amendment, the Commission failed to take the 
opportunity to provide more guidance on the in/out decision, on 
what types of alternatives to consider, or the duration thereof. 
Curiously, after the amendment became effective in 2010, the 
Commission has appeared, at least from a public perspective, to let 
it slip from its attention. Recent publications from the Commission 
do not mention the issue and educational conferences and materials 
fail to highlight and promote any new information on 
alternatives.297 Considering sentencing statistics since then, the 
symposium definitely has not realized an increase in the rate of 
nonprison sentences, as shown in Figure 1 and by the Commission’s 
recent data showing the use of probation has decreased another 
percent, to 9%, through the fourth quarter of fiscal 2013.298 And 
considering the pro-prison positions maintained in the Guidelines, 
the fact that the Commission recently has explicitly invited 
Congress to make statutory changes rendering it more difficult for 
district judges to impose sentences that are contrary to the 
Guidelines and for appellate courts to scrutinize more carefully non-
Guidelines sentences (largely to limit Booker discretion) only 
cements those positions.299 
 294. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 144, at 1–2, 20. 
 295. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL amend. 738 (2012); id. § 5C1.1 cmt. n.6. 
 296. Id. amend. 738. 
 297. See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 117; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
supra note 149. The last two annual training seminars, for instance, do not list any session on 
alternatives. See 2012 National Seminar Materials, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Education_and_Training/Annual_National_Training_Seminar/2012/index.
cfm (last visited Apr. 16, 2014); 2011 National Seminar Materials, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Education_and_Training/Annual_National_Training_ 
Seminar/2011/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 16, 2014). Nor does the Commission’s Online 
Learning Center contain any module clearly relevant to alternatives. See Online Learning 
Center, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, http://www.ussc.gov/Education_and_Training/Online_ 
Learning_Center/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 16, 2014). 
 298. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 22, at 30 tbl.18. 
 299. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 117, at 9. 
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On a more positive front, the Commission has signaled 
that it might finally appreciate that Congress may have lost 
its appetite for absorbing increasing prison costs and building 
more prisons to accommodate a growing prison population. In 
mid-2013, the Commission actually acknowledges, in its list of 
priorities, the congressional edict that it consider the fact that 
prisons are operating over capacity.300 Then again, other than 
such a vague reference, it provides no hint on what direction it 
may take. It is certainly not impossible, for example, to 
provide judges with guidance on the in/out decision as state 
commissions have accomplished such a task and their products 
could serve as guides.301 Nonetheless, whether or not the 
Commission in the future offers any guidance as just 
suggested, there is still an important role that the judiciary 
can play in embracing alternative sentencing. 
C. Judicial Discretion as Policy Driver 
Significantly, federal judges are no longer as beholden to 
the Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines or policies after 
Booker.302 Thus, even if the Commission remains entrenched in 
its pro-prison favoritism, judges may lawfully, individually as 
well as collectively, embrace the Booker-inspired power to 
reengage with alternative sentencing practices and with 
rehabilitation as a primary sentencing philosophy.303 As 
criminal law expert Franklin Zimring has observed, judges can 
make a difference in substantially reducing punishments even 
when the formal rules do not change:  
There is enough free play in the choices available to 
prosecutors and judges that the formal conditions of a 
sentencing regime can remain untouched while the 
punishments delivered by the system can double or drop by 
half! Much of that latitude is contained in the wide discretion 
to either send felons to prison or put them on probation—what 
sentencing analysts call “the in-out decision.”304  
 300. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 149, at 2. 
 301. See, e.g., ALA. SENTENCING COMM’N, PRESUMPTIVE AND VOLUNTARY SENTENCING 
STANDARDS MANUAL 32, 40 (2013), available at http://sentencingcommission.alacourt.gov/ 
SentStandards/Presumptive%20Manual_2013.pdf; MD. STATE COMM’N ON CRIMINAL 
SENTENCING POLICY, MARYLAND SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 30–34 & tbls.8-1 to -3 
(2013), available at http://www.msccsp.org/Files/Guidelines/guidelinesmanual.pdf. 
 302. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005). 
 303. Id. 
 304. Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Policy and Penal Legislation in Recent American 
Experience, 58 STAN. L. REV. 323, 331 (2005).  
                                            
Do Not Delete  4/19/2014  2:00 PM 
2014] PRISON-BY-DEFAULT 1329 
Sentencing expert Nora Demleitner earlier predicted a trend 
toward an increasing rate of probation sentences, speculating after 
Booker rendered the Guidelines advisory that  
as judges may be able to use their increased discretion in a 
post-Booker world, the use of nonprison sentences could 
increase. The danger of unguided discretion in this area 
coupled with the budget cutbacks in the federal prison system 
should provide an incentive for the judiciary and Congress to 
explore greater use of nonprison sentencing options.305  
Unfortunately, this prophecy has not come to pass. At the time 
of her prediction, 17% of federal sentences did not include prison 
terms, yet the rate has only continued to drop, down to 9% through 
the fourth quarter of fiscal 2013.306 Still, there is hope for change in 
the judicial mindset today. Supreme Court Justice Anthony 
Kennedy delivered a speech at an annual American Bar Association 
meeting in which he called on the organization to start a rational 
public discourse on the subject of injustices wrought by the current 
state of America’s prison and correctional systems.307 He declared 
that it was no excuse even if the current prison system was a 
product of neglect rather than intent.308 In response, the 
organization established the ABA Justice Kennedy Commission to 
study correctional problems and to make recommendations.309 The 
group concluded that “the need for incarceration of nonviolent 
offenders may have been exaggerated in the past.”310 The ABA 
Justice Kennedy Commission reported that “many prosecutors, 
judges, defense counsel and legislators who have differing attitudes 
toward crime and punishment share a feeling that more 
incarceration and longer sentences are not always in the public 
interest” and that it is generally preferable to be smarter on crime 
rather than just tougher.311 Perhaps the most significant 
endorsement was that incarceration be reserved for offenders who 
pose the greatest danger to the community and who commit the 
 305. Nora V. Demleitner, Smart Public Policy: Replacing Imprisonment with 
Targeted Nonprison Sentences and Collateral Sanctions, 58 STAN. L. REV. 339, 340 (2005). 
 306. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 22, at 30 tbl.18; supra Figure 1. 
 307. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, 
Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting 1–3 (Aug. 9, 2003), available at 
http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/CR209800/newsletterpubs/Justice_Ke
nnedy_ABA_Speech_Final.pdf. 
 308. Id. at 7. 
 309. JUSTICE KENNEDY COMM’N, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORTS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 
TO THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 4 (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_kennedy_Justic
eKennedyCommissionReportsFinal.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 310. Id. at 23–24. 
 311. Id. at 22. 
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most serious offenses and that “[a]lternatives to incarceration 
should be provided when offenders pose minimal risk to the 
community and appear likely to benefit from rehabilitation 
efforts.”312 Consistent with the initiative, the American Bar 
Association now has adopted a sentencing standard advocating that 
a prison sentence should be mandated by law for a particular 
offense only in the narrow circumstances where “[t]he legislature 
can contemplate no mitigating circumstance that would justify a 
less restrictive sanction.”313 
Others envision that the evolution of the makeup of the 
federal judiciary may bring about positive change in adopting a 
broader alternative sentencing mindset: 
[T]he recent addition of new federal judges with prior 
successful experiences with the use of rehabilitation-
focused sanctions at the state level may be at least a partial 
explanation for the increased proportion of federal 
sentences that are below the recommended federal 
sentencing guideline range. This suggested that many 
federal judges may be amenable to the expanded utilization 
of alternative sanctions, particularly if there is mounting 
evidence that the imposition of these sanctions does not 
pose a public safety threat, but does provide an opportunity 
for not only short-term offender control, but also long-term 
offender change.314 
A survey of federal judges in 2010 showed that a small 
minority of respondents agreed that the Guidelines should at least 
permit a nonprison sentence for a variety of offenses.315 At least 
10% of survey-takers believed that nonincarcerative punishments 
may be appropriate for charges relating to firearms, illegal reentry, 
and assault, while at least 20% approved for offenses involving 
fraud, larceny, and non-distribution child pornography.316 At least 
one out of ten judges approved of the potential for nonprison 
sentences for distributing each of the major types of drugs, ranging 
from 11% for heroin to 22% for marijuana.317 Even Federal District 
Judge William K. Sessions III, former Chair of the Sentencing 
 312. Id. at 9. 
 313. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SENTENCING 18-3.11(c) (3d ed. 1994). 
 314. James M. Byrne & Susan Turner, Reforming Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A 
Modest Proposal, 5 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 220, 222 (2010). Judge Richard A. Posner 
would seem to agree as he writes that “[e]xperience, like training, can inculcate values 
that influence judicial behavior.” RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 95 (2008). 
 315. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Results of Survey of United States District Judges 
January 2010 Through March 2010, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 296, 306 tbl.11 (2011). 
 316. Id.  
 317. Id.  
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Commission, recently suggested a substantially revised sentencing 
grid that would increase opportunities for judges to use alternatives 
to prison.318 
Sentencing data also provide some glimpses that there is at 
least a subset of judges willing to use their Booker power to reject 
the Commission’s guidance on the use of prison as compared to 
alternatives.319 Figure 13 utilizes fiscal 2012 data made available 
by the Commission. It represents the number of nonprison 
sentences issued relative to the grid zone in which the defendants 
fell. Recall that the Commission’s strict policy precludes a nonprison 
sentence in Zones C and D, but as the table illustrates, many 
district judges are issuing nonincarcerative sentences in at least a 
small percentage of cases in those two zones.320 
Figure 13: Sentence Type by Zone, Fiscal 2012321 
The rate of offenders in each of the Zones in fiscal 2012 
receiving a nonprison sentence for Zones A, B, C, and D, 
ratchet downward in the expected fashion, at 37%, 21%, 15%, 
and 3%, respectively. While the presence of nonprison 
 318. See William K. Sessions III, At the Crossroads of the Three Branches: The U.S. 
Sentencing Commission’s Attempts to Achieve Sentencing Reform in the Midst of Inter-Branch 
Power Struggles, 26 J.L. & POL. 305, 343–45 (2011) (agreeing, too, with Attorney General 
Holder that smart sentencing practices would embrace alternatives more often). 
 319. 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 166, at 44–45; 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 
166, at 36–37. 
 320. See Mark Osler, Seeking Justice Below the Guidelines: Sentencing as an Expression 
of Natural Law, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 172 n.30 (2010) (expressing surprise at the rate 
of variances considering judges intent on using probation are faced with a myriad of ways to 
manipulate fact findings such that a technical variance is not required). 
 321. Data derived from statistical analyses using standard statistical software of the 
Sentencing Commission’s fiscal 2012 datafile, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_ 
and_Statistics/Datafiles/SPSSopafy12nid.zip (fine-only sentences are included under the term 
Probation in the table). 
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sentences in Zones C and D occur for a variety of reasons in 
individual cases that may comply with Guidelines rules (such 
as government-sponsored departures the Guidelines formally 
permit), the percentages represent as well the fact and 
frequency of judges in individual cases assuming their Booker-
provided authority to disregard the Guidelines policy 
precluding probation. Conducting another data run using the 
same fiscal 2012 datafile, results showed that 55% and 41% of 
the probation/alternative sentences in Zones C and D, 
respectively, exemplified discretionary judicial departures.  
Nonetheless, despite positive clues for substantial change 
on actual in/out decision practices, and despite the legal 
flexibility provided by Booker and Kimbrough to reject the 
Commission’s policy of prison by default, the rate of nonprison 
sentences continues to fall.322 In a country in which probation 
is the most common sentence overall and in which multiple 
states are actively pursuing alternative methods to control 
their prison populations, it is a curiosity as to why the federal 
judiciary remains the exception. Perhaps it is merely a matter 
of the gravitational pull of cultural norms. A commentator 
observes that the “culture of punishment solely through 
imprisonment has permeated the system for so long that 
lawmakers, judges, district attorneys, and probation officers 
think that justice can only be satisfied through a sentence of 
incarceration.”323 To be sure, a sentencing outcome does not 
epitomize an isolated decision made solely by the sentencing 
judge. Instead, sentencing often is a sort of negotiated product 
from a courtroom community in which normative practices 
may be at play. The members of the courtroom community, 
who often rely on each other to better attain efficient case 
processing, may have come to agreement on the “normal 
penalties” and “going rates” for certain types of crimes in their 
courtroom or district.324 Normative practices, though, can 
certainly change and evolve. Our system of law, based as it is 
on the common law, enjoys a long history of judicial activism 
and cultural shifts due to internal and external changes in 
circumstances.325 
 322. See supra Figure 1. 
 323. Hoelter, supra note 99, at 56. 
 324. CASSIA SPOHN, HOW DO JUDGES DECIDE?: THE SEARCH FOR FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE 
IN PUNISHMENT 124 (2d ed. 2009). 
 325. See Ian Holloway, Judicial Activism in an Historical Context: Of the Necessity for 
Discretion, 24 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 297, 320 (1994) (discussing the adaptability of the 
common law and its origins in a myriad of divergent ideas). 
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Several district judges are acting as leaders in conveying the 
message through published opinions, often sternly worded, that 
the Sentencing Guidelines offer too punitive of sentences and, as 
a result, judges can and should exercise their legal authority to 
reject them and their underlying policies as and when necessary. 
Judges Jack B. Weinstein (E.D.N.Y.),326 Mark W. Bennett (N.D. 
Iowa),327 and Lynn Adelman (E.D. Wis.),328 among others, are 
penning thoughtful opinions providing support for viewing the 
Guidelines and Commission policies with a critical eye and 
espousing the judiciary’s professional expertise in meting out 
reasonable punishments. As a former federal judge and 
sentencing scholar recently suggested, the Commission itself 
should more aggressively track and highlight district-level 
decisions for the educational benefit of others in the judiciary.329 
It is true that the use of judicial discretion may not have the 
ability to foster substantial percentage changes in the in/out 
decision because of the application of mandatory minimum 
statutes330 and the general unavailability of alternative sanctions 
for the growing immigration offense population.331 But, as the 
Commission itself has noted, there are loopholes through which 
judges, perhaps with prosecutors complicit, can counteract at 
least mandatory minimum prison floors.332 The inability to 
impact the likelihood of imprisonment for noncitizens also is not 
dispositive considering the recent upward trend in immigration 
prosecutions is more a matter of immigration politics 
 326. See, e.g., United States v. D.M., 942 F. Supp. 2d 327, 343, 352 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(sentencing child pornography defendant to probation despite the Guidelines prohibiting 
such an option); United States v. Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d 617, 649–51 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(criticizing mass incarceration). 
 327. See, e.g., United States v. Newhouse, 919 F. Supp. 2d 955, 957, 973–74 (N.D. 
Iowa 2013) (asking rhetorically whether the “grid and bear it scheme” of the career 
offender recidivist guidelines “raise[s] a specter of aperiodic, irrational, and arbitrary 
sentencing guideline ranges in some cases,” and answering in the positive); United States 
v. Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1091 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (ruling the child pornography 
guideline recommendations are not parsimonious). 
 328. See, e.g., United States v. McDaniels, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124763, at *1–2, 
*5–7 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 27, 2011) (sentencing defendant to probation despite his placement in 
Zone D); United States v. Reyes, 2007 WL 1795466, at *3 (E.D. Wis. June 19, 2007) 
(sentencing defendant to probation despite his being placed in Zone C). 
 329. Nancy Gertner, Advice for the US Sentencing Commission from Former 
USDJ Nancy Gertner, SENT’G L. & POL’Y BLOG (Sept. 30, 2013, 10:15 AM), 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2013/09/advice-for-the-us-
sentencing-commission-from-former-usdj-nancy-gertner.html#comments. 
 330. Robert Batey, The Costs of Judicial Restraint: Forgone Opportunities to Limit 
America’s Imprisonment Binge, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 29, 37 
(2007). 
 331. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 144, at 4. 
 332. See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 155, at 345–46. 
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independent of criminal justice policy. Further, deportation is an 
executive decision rather than a judicial one.333 Overall, there 
exists much evidence that a cultural shift amongst the federal 
judiciary toward embracing alternative sentencing may now be 
on the horizon. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The federal sentencing system is facing a host of newly 
offered criticism for its role in contributing to the country’s 
shameful recent experience with mass incarceration. The federal 
prison system keeps reaching records for the number of prisoners 
it houses and the rate at which it incarcerates its own residents. 
A main contributor to those statistical measures is the 
plummeting rate at which federal defendants are sentenced to 
nonprison sentences. In turn, as this Article posits, a major 
source of that statistic is the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which 
earlier on adopted, and has continued to maintain, various 
prison-by-default policies in its Sentencing Guidelines. The 
federal judiciary, though used to issuing nonprison sentences in 
about half the cases before the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 
has seemed to unfortunately follow the Commission’s guidance 
with respect thereto, considering that since then sentences 
include prison in a substantial majority of cases.  
Circumstances have changed, though, for political, financial, 
philosophical, and pragmatic reasons, and presumptive prison 
sentencing practices are being questioned by important figures 
interested in criminal justice and fiscal issues. An unlikely 
confederation of ideologically diverse individuals and groups are 
on board, as is the Department of Justice. This Article makes the 
case that a timely change in federal sentencing policy is 
appropriate that would reverse the presumption that a prison 
term is virtually always necessary. Both the Sentencing 
Commission and the federal judiciary should replace these 
policies and practices with a normative culture that envisions a 
prison sentence as only appropriate when certain facts and 
circumstances unique to the individual case indicate that a 
prison term is the least restrictive alternative. Such a policy 
would have various benefits, such as reducing incarceration 
rates, alleviating prison overcrowding, fostering rehabilitative 
potential, providing just sentencing, protecting the individual 
and the community better, and, more broadly, aligning the 
federal system with state and global norms of sentencing.  
 333. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012). 
                                            
